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ABSTRACT 
There is considerable support for extending the temporary repeal of the federal 
estate tax in 2010 into a permanent repeal. Although repealing the federal estate tax 
would simplify the current tax system, it may also impair the federal government's ability 
to prudently aid eleemosynary organizations if charitable bequests' preferential tax 
treatment is a budget efficient policy. Furthermore, overall charitable bequests may also 
decline in the absence of a federal estate tax. 
Using Virginia and Louisiana probate records from the years 2000-2005, tax 
policy questions are examined regarding the federal estate tax and charitable bequests. 
Tobit regression models, adjusted for heteroscedasticity where appropriate, suggest that a 
federal estate tax with deductible charitable bequests is a budget efficient policy. That is, 
the deductibility of charitable bequests, for federal estate tax purposes, induces a greater 
percentage increase in charitable bequests than the corresponding forgone percentage of 
tax revenue. At the same time, there is evidence that repealing the federal estate tax 
would generate a larger percentage increase in charitable bequests than the percentage 
increase in decedents' wealth through federal estate tax savings. Overall, charitable 
bequests are predicted to decrease if the federal estate tax is repealed. Additionally, the 
generality of probate research is enhanced by examining multiple states that are diverse 
in their geographical locations and marital property laws. 
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iv 
The results of the present study are robust under different tax structure 
assumptions (i.e., date of death, date of will, and expected date of death). Moreover, the 
results are generally consistent for filers and non-filers of federal estate tax returns as 
well as the entire sample. 
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Charitable bequests represent an important source of funding for eleemosynary 
organizations.! Specifically, postmortem charitable receipts exceeded $17.44 billion in 
2005 (AAFRC 2006). Beyond satisfying a sense of social responsibility, the 
attractiveness of charitable bequests is enhanced by their exemption from estate taxes. 
However, charitable bequests will temporarily lose their estate tax deductibility when 
estate taxes are suspended in 2010. Furthermore, charitable bequests will permanently 
forgo this tax advantage if estate taxes are repealed. Before eliminating the charitable 
bequest tax incentive, two important tax policy questions need to be addressed. First, 
does the preferential tax treatment of charitable bequests stimulate more giving than is 
lost in tax revenue? Second, what will the net impact be on charitable bequests if estate 
taxes are permanently repealed? 
Estate Tax System 
in the U.S. 
Federal estate taxes are assessed on property transferred by decedents. 
Computing the federal estate tax liability is a multi-step process. First, the gross 
1 Within the context of this study, charitable bequests are defined as being the eleemosynary legacies 
specified in a decedent's will. 
1 
2 
estate consists of the value of the decedent's interest in all property at least partially 
owned by the decedent. For married decedents in community property states, the gross 
estate includes one half of the couple's interest in the community property. The taxable 
estate is derived by subtracting several deductions from the gross estate. Deductions are 
allowed for debts, funeral expenses, administrative expenses, spousal bequests, casualty 
and theft losses, and charitable bequests. Next, the tentative estate tax is computed by 
using the Unified Transfer Tax Rate Schedule, as presented Table 1.1. However, the 
tentative estate tax is reduced by the unified credit that equals the estate tax on the portion 
of the estate up to the exemption equivalent. For example, in 2000 when the exemption 
equivalent was $675,000, the maximum unified credit equaled $135,550, i.e., $70,800 
plus $64,750 (($675,000 - 500,000) x 37%). 
3 
Table 1.1 Pre-2002 Unified Transfer Rate Schedule 










































































The two highest tax brackets of 53 percent and 55 percent apply to estates of decedents dying, and gifts 
made, on or before December 31,2001. For estates of decedents dying, and gifts made, after December 31, 
2001, for amounts over $2,500,000 the tax is $1,025,800 plus 50% of the amount in excess of $2,500,000. 
Beginning in 2003, the top marginal rate is 49 percent, applying to all estates of decedents of more than 
$2,000,000. This amount is reduced incrementally every year until 2007 (48 percent in 2004,47 percent in 
2005,46 percent in 2006,45 percent in 2007). In 2007,2008, and 2009, the top marginal rate holds at 45 
percent, applying to estates of more than $1,500,000. 
Source: CCH (2007). 
State Death Tax Credit 
The estates of all decedents who departed from life prior to 2005 are also eligible 
for the state death tax credit. As discussed in Smith et al. (2006), besides being limited to 
the amount actually paid, there are three additional restrictions placed on the state death 
tax credit. First, the state death tax credit tables are applied to the adjusted taxable estate, 
4 
i.e., the taxable estate minus $60,000. Second, the state death tax credit cannot exceed 
the gross estate tax reduced by the applicable credit amount. 
Third, pursuant to the 2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act hereafter EGTRRA (P.L. 107-16), the allowable state death credit is reduced by 25 
percent in 2002, 50 percent in 2003, 75 percent in 2004, 100 percent from 2005 through 
2010, and is completely restored in 2011. Moreover, the credit for state death taxes paid 
is replaced by a deduction when computing the taxable estate in 2005 through 2010. 
State governments administer a wide variety of death tax policies. Prior to the 
EGTRRA, the majority of states relied on a. pick-up system to assess state level estate 
taxes equal to the credit allowed on the federal estate tax return. After the inception of 
the EGTRRA, state governments generally proceeded with one of the three following 
courses of action. First, Louisiana and others maintained the pick-up system, which 
means they do not assess estate taxes from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2010. 
Second, the majority of pick-up states decoupled their estate tax law because the 
EGTRRA gradually eliminates the state death tax credit. These decoupled states no 
longer are attached to changes that occur in the federal estate tax law. Rather, they 
enacted either their own state law or linked the state law to federal law prior to 
EGTRRA. Third, other states have enacted legislation to repeal their estate taxes. 
Certain states used a combination of these options, e.g., Virginia. Between January 1, 
2005 and June 30, 2007 Virginia assessed estate taxes based on pre-EGTRRA law. That 
is, state estate taxes equaled the state death tax credit allowable prior the EGTRRA. 
Then, Virginia repealed state assessed estate taxes for all persons who die on or after July 
1,2007. 
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Effects of Charitable Bequests: 
An Example 
The subsequent scenario demonstrates how deductible charitable bequests impact 
a decedent's federal estate tax liability: Jeffrey Wiedlandt, a resident of Virginia, died 
with a gross estate of $5 million. He is unmarried and liable for $40,000 in debts. After 
his death, funeral and administrative expenses are incurred in the amounts of $10,000 and 
$7,000, respectively. In his final will, Jeffrey bequeathed $600,000 to the local Southern 
Baptist Church. Figure 1.1 illustrates the effects of the charitable bequests deduction if 
Jeffrey departed from life on January 1, 2007. At that time, the Virginia estate tax is 
based upon the credit for state death taxes allowed under Section 2011, in effect on 
January 1, 1978. Figure 1.2 presents the impact of deductible charitable bequests 
assuming Jeffrey died on August 1, 2007, which is after the Virginia estate tax is 
repealed. 
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Estate Tax Liability if Charitable Bequests: 
Estate Tax Return Item 
Total gross estate 
Debts of the decedent 
Funeral expenses 
Estate administration expenses 
Charitable bequests deduction 
Tentative taxable estate 
State death tax deduction1 
Taxable estate2 
Tentative tax:3 $ 10,000 @ 18.0% 
10,000 @ 20.0% 
20,000 @ 22.0% 
20,000 @ 24.0% 
20,000 @ 26.0% 
20,000 @ 28.0% 
50,000 @ 30.0% 
100,000 @ 32.0% 
250,000 @ 34.0% 
250,000 @ 37.0% 
250,000 @ 39.0% 
250,000 @ 41.0% 
250,000 @ 43.0% 
3,057,784 @ 45.0% 
2,555,292 @ 45.0% 
Allowable unified credit 
Net estate tax4 
Gross amount of charitable bequest 
Less: Charitable bequest tax savings 



























































»$1,151,003 - $924,881 = $226,121 
1. State death tax deduction is computed pursuant to 2007 Virginia law for persons who die before July 1, 
2007. 
2. Adjusted taxable gifts made by the decedent after December 31,1976 are assumed to be zero. 
3. 2007 tax rates are used. Also, the total gift taxes paid or payable with respect to gifts made by the 
decedent after December 31, 1976, are assumed to be zero. 
4. Credits for foreign death taxes and prior transfers are assumed to be zero. Generation-skipping transfer 
(GST) taxes are also assumed to be zero. 
Figure 1.1 Impact of Deductible Charitable Bequests on the Federal Estate Tax Liability 
for a Resident of Virginia Departing from Life Between 1/1/2007 and 6/30/2007 
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Estate Tax Liability if Charitable Bequests: 
Estate Tax Return Item 
Total gross estate 
Debts of the decedent 
Funeral expenses 
Estate administration expenses 
Charitable bequests deduction 
Tentative taxable estate 
State death tax deduction1 
Taxable estate2 
Tentative tax:3 $ 10,000 @ 18.0% 
10,000 @ 20.0% 
20,000 @ 22.0% 
20,000 @ 24.0% 
20,000 @ 26.0% 
20,000 @ 28.0% 
50,000 @ 30.0% 
100,000 @ 32.0% 
250,000 @ 34.0% 
250,000 @ 37.0% 
250,000 @ 39.0% 
250,000 @ 41.0% 
250,000 @ 43.0% 
3,057,784 @ 45.0% 
2,555,292 @ 45.0% 
Allowable unified credit 
Net estate tax4 
Gross amount of charitable bequest 
Less: Charitable bequest tax savings 



























































*$1,324,350 - $1,054,350 = $270,000 
1. State death tax deduction is computed pursuant to 2007 Virginia law for persons who die on or after July 
1,2007. 
2. Adjusted taxable gifts made by the decedent after December 31,1976 are assumed to be zero. 
3. 2007 tax rates are used. Also, the total gift taxes paid or payable with respect to gifts made by the 
decedent after December 31,1976, are assumed to be zero. 
4. Credits for foreign death taxes and prior transfers are assumed to be zero. Generation-skipping transfer 
(GST) taxes are also assumed to be zero. 
Figure 1.2 Impact of Deductible Charitable Bequests on the Federal Estate Tax Liability 
for a Resident of Virginia Departing from Life Between 7/1/2007 and 12/31/2007 
Changes in the Federal 
Estate Tax 
Table 1.2 denotes that there are substantial recent changes to both the exemption 
equivalent and the maximum estate tax rate. For example, the highest tax rate decreased 
by nine percent, and the exemption equivalent also increased by $1,325,000. Combined, 
these changes caused a dramatic reduction in the decedents' estate tax liabilities. To 
demonstrate, a decedent in 2000 with a $2,000,000 taxable estate would have a federal 
estate tax liability of $420,250 ($555,800 tentative estate tax - $135,550 unified tax 
credit). Conversely, the federal estate tax liability would be zero for a decedent in 2006 
with a $2,000,000 taxable estate. 
Table 1.2 Changes in the Exemption Amounts and the Highest Tax Rates 








Charitable Bequest Tax Policy Analysis 
Charitable giving is negatively related to the cost of giving (Smith 1980). 
Therefore, the federal government has a long history of encouraging charitable donations 
by offering tax benefits to contributors (Joulfaian 2000a). Currently, there is a two-fold 
incentive system in place. First, lifetime charitable contribution deductions are offered to 
















what property can be donated, which charitable organizations qualify, and the maximum 
deductible amount.2 Second, the estate of an individual who dies testate (i.e., with a will) 
is allowed deductions for all charitable bequest stipulated in the will.3 
Charitable bequests provide two advantages over charitable income tax incentives 
for individuals and corporations. First, the deduction available to estates is not limited. 
Rather, charitable bequests offer a dollar for dollar reduction in the decedent's taxable 
estate. Second, there are fewer restrictions regarding which organizations qualify as 
charitable entities. These advantageous tax incentives are necessary because heirs of the 
testator normally receive priority over charitable organizations in the allocation of assets. 
During the 1970's, there was considerable discussion of increasing tax revenue by 
abolishing the charitable bequest deduction (Boskin 1976). As such, empirical research 
examined if the charitable bequest deduction is a budget efficient tax policy. In other 
words, does the charitable bequest exemption stimulate more funds to be transferred to 
not-for-profit organizations than is lost in tax revenue? If it is, the charitable exemption 
is a tax policy mechanism that effectively subsidizes charitable entities (Bennett 1990). 
The budget efficiency of deductible charitable bequests exists if there is a 
negatively elastic relationship between charitable bequests and the relative charitable 
bequest tax price (hereinafter tax price) which is equal tol .00 minus the marginal tax rate. 
A negative tax price elasticity with an absolute value in excess of 1.00 indicates a budget 
efficient tax policy because it reports that a 1% increase in tax price will correspond with 
a larger than 1% decrease in charitable bequests. In practical terms, this means that the 
2 Code Section 170. 
3 Code Section 2055. 
10 
additional revenue generated by increasing the tax price will be more than offset by the 
decrease in charitable bequests. 
The current debate concerns the repeal of estate taxes. The EGTRRA reduces the 
federal estate tax between 2002 and 2009, repeals it completely in 2010, and brings back 
the 2001 estate tax rules in 2011. Slemrod (2006) notes 82 percent of respondents in a 
recent survey support the permanent repeal of the federal estate tax.4 Thus, the efficiency 
of charitable bequests is still an important consideration. In essence, if preferential 
treatment of charitable bequests is tax efficient, then repealing estate taxes would impair 
the federal government's ability to prudently aid eleemosynary organizations. 
Tax Price Identification 
Barthold and Plotnick (1984) discuss two interrelated theoretical reasons why the 
deductibility of charitable bequests for estate tax purposes increases the overall amount of 
charitable bequests. First, the substitution effect assumes that charitable bequests are 
stimulated since they have a lower tax price than other bequest options.5 For example, if 
a decedent faces a 40% marginal tax rate then it only costs 60 cents to give one dollar to 
charity because of 40 cents is saved in taxes by not giving the dollar to other non-spousal 
heirs. 
The second theoretical reason, wealth effect, is created by the positive relation 
between the extent of a decedent's charitable bequests and the amount of his/her financial 
resources. The deductibility of charitable bequests amplifies this wealth effect by 
increasing decedent's wealth because of the corresponding reduction in his/her estate tax 
liability. Wealth effect is measured in empirical studies by examining the elasticity of 
4 Slemrod (2006) attributes these results to misconceptions regarding the estate tax. Nevertheless, there is 
abundant support for permanently repealing the estate tax. 
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decedents' wealth. Repealing estate taxes eliminates the substitution effect but at the 
same time increases decedents wealth. Therefore, predicting the overall change in 
charitable bequests in the absence of an estate tax requires a net gain assessment of the 
changes in the substitution and wealth effects. 
The correlation between the substitution and wealth effects necessitates precise 
identification of the tax price. Unfortunately, the uniqueness of death limits charitable 
bequest research to cross sectional data (Poterba 1998). Utilizing cross sectional data to 
accurately identify the tax price is difficult because decedents with similar amounts of 
wealth face comparable estate tax liabilities. As such, attributing charitable bequests to 
either a decedent's level of wealth or tax prices is challenging. For this reason, the 
present inquiry contains both cross-year and within-year variation in the tax price to 
assist in the tax price identification process. 
Examination of 
Probate Records 
There are two sources of information available to gauge the impact of estate taxes 
on charitable bequests: federal estate tax returns and probate court records.6 Probate 
court records are utilized in this study because of the following reasons. First, federal 
estate tax returns are confidential whereas probate court records are public documents. 
Naturally, the accessibility of probate documents is an asset to this study. Second, 
probate records contain a more diverse set of estates because probate filing requirements 
are lower than the federal estate tax returns. For example, 66 percent of the probate 
records in Brunetti's (2005) study have gross estates below the federal estate tax filing 
threshold. Probate records beneath the federal estate tax filing requirements are 
5 A spousal bequest is an important exception to the substitution effect because it is also fully deductible. 
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important because certain states impose estate and/or inheritance taxes even if no federal 
estate tax is due. Also, valuable information regarding trends in charitable bequests can 
be delineated from those estates that do not file federal estate tax returns. Third, only 
probate records contain the most recent date when the will was revised (i.e., the date of 
will), which indicates if the charitable bequest decision is based on either the current or 
the past tax rates. Without this insight, error is likely introduced into the tax price when 
assessing a sample period containing several changes in tax rates (Clotfelter 1985). 
Fourth, information regarding the number of surviving children is only available in 
probate records. 
Description of the 
Inheritance Tax 
Bakija and Gale (2003) suggest that while time-series analysis enhances the tax-
price identification process, it creates difficulties in delineating the changes in tax rates 
from other temporal effects. Within-year tax price variation, on the other hand, is more 
robust in addressing this limitation. For this reason, Louisiana decedents are examined 
because they are subject to state administered estate and inheritance taxes. Inheritance 
taxes are assessed by a few state governments as a complement of or as a substitute to 
state level estate taxes. As displayed in Table 1.3, Louisiana inheritance taxes are 
different from estate taxes because the heirs or legatees pay tax on the assets they receive. 
The inheritance tax computation for each heir or legatees is determined by his/her 
relationship to the deceased. As a result, inheritance taxes provide variation in the 
amount of total death taxes assessed on a decedent's final estate.7 
6 Survey analysis exists but is not discussed herein because this research focus is on legal documents. 
7 Louisiana decedents' state death tax equals the greater of the inheritance tax or the Louisiana estate tax. 
Thus, the inheritance tax only induces tax price variation when it is greater than the Louisiana estate tax. 
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Table 1.3 Taxable Values for Rates for the Louisiana Inheritance Tax 
Relationship to the Deceased 
Spouse 
Direct decedents by blood or 
affinity or ascendants 
Collateral relation of the 
decedent (including brothers 
and sisters by affinity and 
their decedents) 
Stranger or nonrelated person 











First $20,000 taxable value 
Taxable value in excess of 
$20,000 
First $20,000 taxable value 
Taxable value in excess of 
$20,000 
First $5,000 taxable value 













The other state examined in this study, Virginia, did not administer an inheritance 
tax during the sample period, which causes the Virginia decedents to have different tax 
prices than the Louisiana decedents between January 1, 2000 and June 30, 2004. 
However, Table 1.4 illustrates that this variation between Louisiana and Virginia 
decreases during the sample period because the Louisiana inheritance tax is phased out 
between July 1, 1998 and June 30, 2004. Nevertheless, the existence of a Louisiana 
inheritance tax within 64 percent of the sample period increases tax price variation. 
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Table 1.4 Phasing Out of the Louisiana Inheritance Tax 
Time Period Reduction in the Inheritance Tax Rates 
July 1,1998 - June 30, 2001 18.00% 
July 1, 2001 - June 30, 2002 40.00% 
July 1, 2002 - June 30, 2003 60.00% 
July 1, 2003 - June 30, 2004 80.00% 
After June 30, 2004 100.00% 
Econometric Modeling 
Considerations 
The majority of decedents leave zero charitable bequests. Boskin (1976) states 
that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) does not account for this abundance of zero's or that 
charitable observations must be non-negative (i.e., they are censored). Moreover, 
systematically removing these observations from the dataset "throws away" information 
(Kennedy 2005, 283) and continues to produce biased and inconsistent estimators 
(Gujarati 2003, 616). 
Given that charitable bequest data is censored, researchers in this arena rely upon 
the Tobit model. Proposed in Tobin (1958), the Tobit model is a censored regression 
model where the dependent variable observations are censored if they are below a lower 
limit value. For the purposes of this study, the lower limit value is zero because it is not 
possible to leave negative charitable bequests. 
Notwithstanding its widespread application, the maximum likelihood estimation 
of the Tobit model produces inconsistent estimates if there is heteroscedasticity 
(Arabmazar and Schmidt 1981) or non-normality (Arabmazar and Schmidt 1982) in the 
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distribution of the error terms. For this reason, the current study examines the error 
distributions for homogeneity and normality. Several potential remedies are explored 
when the error distribution deviates from either of these assumptions. 
Significance of the Problem 
The primary objective of charitable bequest research in the tax policy arena is to 
ascertain if the tax-free status of charitable bequests is a budget efficient tax policy. That 
is, does the preferential tax treatment motivate more charitable bequests than is lost in 
subsequent tax revenue? 
The efficiency question is important because if tax-free charitable bequests are 
budget efficient, then repealing the estate tax will remove an important charitable 
subsidizing tool of the government. The result of repealing the estate tax is an increase in 
the tax price of charitable, as well as spousal, bequests to 1.00, which equals the tax price 
of all other heirs. As a result, it is valuable to understand the relationship between 
increasing the tax price and the extent of charitable bequests. Empirical evidence 
regarding this relationship is attained by assessing the elasticity of the tax price. The 
existence of an estate tax with fully deductible charitable bequests is efficient if the tax 
price elasticity is negative with an absolute value larger than one. Specifically, this 
indicates that eleemosynary organizations are expected to have a percentage decrease in 
charitable bequests that is greater than the percentage increase in tax price if charitable 
bequests do not provide a tax advantage relative to other heirs. 
Unfortunately, probate record studies that estimate the tax price use data sources 
that are at least twenty years old. More recent data is utilized in federal estate tax return 
studies; however, they do not have access to important information such as the last will 
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revision date. Furthermore, the extant literature does not report if the Tobit model error 
distributions adhere to the error distribution assumptions of homogeneity and normality. 
An empirical investigation of recent probate records is needed to assess how 
repealing the estate tax will influence charitable bequests. On the one hand, repealing the 
estate tax will have a detrimental effect upon charitable bequests if the tax price is elastic. 
On the other hand, repealing the estate tax will increase decedents overall wealth because 
taxes will no longer be transferred to the government. The extent that the wealth effect 
may potentially dampen or outweigh the tax price effect is an empirical issue to be 
investigated. 
Objectives of the Study 
The focus of this research endeavor is to assess whether deductible charitable 
bequests are a tax efficient policy. The upcoming one-year suspension and potential 
permanent repeal of federal estate taxes compels empirical evidence to be garnered. 
Previous studies generally report the deductible charitable bequests as being a budget 
efficient tax policy. However, the extant literature does not test the homogeneity and 
normality error distribution assumptions of the Tobit models they employ. Also, prior 
charitable bequest pattern inferences may not be relevant because the most recent probate 
data assessed is over twenty years old. In addition, prior probate research limits analysis 
to a single-state, which restricts the results generality. This study complements and 
overcomes some of the literatures' limitations by investigating four research questions. 
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Overview of Research Questions 
Research Question 1 
The first research question investigates whether the deductibility of charitable 
bequests create a budget efficient tax policy? Federal estate tax return research (e.g., 
Boskin (1976), Joulfaian 2000b, and Joulfaian (2005)) generally finds tax-free charitable 
bequests as being budget efficient. Probate record data studies, by contrast, note 
inconsistent results. Specifically, Brunetti (2005) and Bennett (1990) report an elastic tax 
price; however, Barthold and Plotnick (1984) notes that tax price does not affect 
charitable bequests. 
One reason for this conflict in conclusions is that probate studies are able to 
analyze a broader distribution of wealth than federal estate tax return inquiries. For 
instance, Brunneti (2005) reports that deductible charitable bequests are not an efficient 
tax policy in his subsample of probate records with wealth levels below the federal estate 
tax filing requirements. Nevertheless, extant probate literature lacks generalizability 
because each study is limited to an individual state. Since prior probate studies assess 
records that are over twenty years old, they may not represent current charitable bequest 
patterns. 
Recognizing these shortcomings, the present research examines a wide wealth 
distribution of recent probate records from two states. The tax price is investigated by 
analyzing Louisiana and Virginia probate records from the years 2000-2005. The tax 
price elasticity is expected to be negative with an absolute value larger than one. 
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Research Question 2 
The second research question gauges if wealth has an elastic or inelastic influence 
on charitable bequests? The elasticity of wealth provides evidence regarding the 
magnitude of the wealth effect for this study's decedents. Based on prior research, the 
elasticity of wealth is expected to be positive and above the unity (.i.e. +1.00). 
Research Question 3 
The third research question explored is: What effect does the decedent's location 
have on charitable bequests? Decedents in Louisiana and Virginia are expected to have 
different charitable bequest patterns because Louisiana is a community property state 
while Virginia is not. Previous probate record inquiries do not test for community 
property state differences because they are single-state studies. Furthermore, Boskin 
(1976) is the only Tobit regression federal estate tax return study to examine the potential 
community property effect. In all but one model specification, Boskin reports 
community property decedents leave significantly less charitable bequests. Other omitted 
confounding geographical differences between the two states may also exist. 
Research Question 4 
The fourth research question investigated is: What is the predicted effect of 
repealing the estate tax on charitable bequests under EGTRRA? The predicted change in 
charitable bequests is the net change of wealth and tax price effects. Prior researchers 
estimate that the net of these two effects decrease charitable bequests between 4 and 12 
percent. Given the developing debate over the permanent repeal of estate taxes, this 
study estimates its effect on charitable organizations with timely data taken from a 
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diverse set of decedents. The repeal is expected to dramatically impact charitable 
bequests; however, there are no a priori directional or magnitude of change predictions. 
Organization of the Study 
This dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the relationship 
between estate taxes and charitable bequests. Moreover, it highlights the importance of 
this topic and the motivation for the present study. 
Chapter 2 reviews the pertinent charitable bequest literature that has a direct 
influence upon the current research. Chapter 3 presents the research questions, the 
hypotheses, and the methodology by which they are tested. That is, the sampling 
procedure is explained, alternative statistical methodologies are contrasted, and variables 
of interest are discussed along with their coding schemes. Chapter 4 contains empirical 
findings including descriptive statistics and research question findings. Chapter 5 
discusses the empirical results, provides conclusions, and suggests areas of future 
research. Also, this study's limitations are detailed. 
CHAPTER 2 
SELECTED LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several research inquiries investigate the influence of estate taxes on charitable 
bequests, and each endeavor provides insights on the issue. Nevertheless, this selected 
literature review focuses on research that formulates the basis of this study's econometric 
modeling techniques, tax price identification method, and data selection. The reviewed 
studies are grouped into two categories: federal estate tax return and probate record 
research. Federal estate tax return studies are reviewed because they initiated and remain 
a cornerstone in this research arena. Probate record inquiries are discussed since they are 
closest in spirit to the present research. 
Federal Estate Tax Return Research 
The first empirical research in the relationship between estate taxes and charitable 
bequests is performed with federal estate tax returns. This data source provides large and 
geographically diverse samples which increases the generalizability of results. 
McNees 
McNees (1973) investigates the economic consequences of allowing charitable 
bequests to be deductible under estate taxes. His sample consists of the U.S. Office of 
Internal Revenue's Special Study of 1957 and 1959 Estate Taxation. Instead of utilizing 
the entire data set, McNees only incorporates the charitable bequest observations into his 
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OLS model. The dependent variable is defined as the value of the charitable bequests. 
The independent variables of primary interest are the decedent's gross marginal tax rate 
and size estate. McNees accounts for other influences on charitable bequests by 
including the following control variables: marital status, dependency index, tax 
sensitivity, bequests in trusts, age, and residency. Results are reported for three separate 
regressions: all estates, estates of more than $1 million, and estates of less than $1 
million. 
Both the all estates and the estates of more than $1 million regressions indicate 
that marginal tax rates have a significantly positive relationship with amount of charitable 
bequests. Conversely, charitable bequests for estates of less than $1 million are not 
significantly influenced by the marginal tax rate. 
Estate size is defined as the gross estate net of debt, administrative, and funeral 
expenses but not of taxes. It enters as a linear variable in the model of estates less than 
$1 million and is significantly positive. Meanwhile, estate size is a quadratic term and is 
significantly positive in the all estates and estates of more than $1 million models. 
A degree of dependency index is utilized to capture the level of responsibility a 
decedent has over individuals he/she leaves behind. Rather than containing how many 
heirs receive bequests from a decedent, McNees's data only has the number of 
dependency categories that are receiving bequests. Dependency categories include 
spouse, children, parents, grandchildren, siblings, other relatives, non-relatives, and 
unidentified recipients. McNees includes the sum of the number of categories receiving 
bequests as his degree of dependency index. The degree of dependency index is 
significantly negative in all three regression models. 
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An approximation of a decedent's tax sensitivity enters the model, and is 
measured by the amount of inter vivos gifts a decedent made. The expectation being that 
decedents who recognize the tax advantages of life-time gift giving are more likely to 
utilize the deductibility of charitable bequests. Tax sensitivity is significantly positive for 
the all estates and estates of more than $1 million regressions but is insignificant for the 
non-millionaire decedents. 
The percentage of non-charitable bequests made in the form of trusts is 
incorporated into the model. McNees offers two interpretations of trust usage. First, it is 
similar to inter vivos gifts and acts as a complement to charitable bequests. Second, it is 
an alternative form of tax avoidance that reduces the demand for charitable bequests. 
Bequests in trusts are significantly negative in each regression. 
Marital status dummy variables are used to categorize decedents as either being a 
husband, wife, widower, or widow. Single decedents represent the baseline of the marital 
status categorical variables. The husband term is significantly negative in the non-
millionaire regression model; however, it is insignificant in the remaining two models. 
Wives leave significantly more charitable bequests in the all estates and millionaire 
models. And yet, non-millionaire wives leave significantly fewer charitable bequests. 
The widower classification is significantly negative in the non-millionaire model but 
insignificant in the other regressions. Widows leave significantly fewer charitable 
bequests in all three models. 
Although the decedent's age is added as a control variable, it is not influential. 
The insignificance of age might be the result of conflicting effects during an individual's 
life cycle. Younger decedents have greater financial responsibilities (e.g., providing for 
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dependents). By contrast, older individuals often maintain a higher standard of living. 
McNees also notes that residency in a community property state is insignificant. 
Boskin 
Boskin (1976) estimates a Tobit regression model on all of the observations, 
charitable as well as non-charitable bequests, in the Internal Revenue Service Special 
Study of 1957 and 1959 Estate Taxation data. Boskin explains that this re-analysis of the 
McNees data is necessary because McNees's approach of using OLS on strictly the 
charitable bequest observations is not correct. The inappropriateness of the McNees OLS 
model specification is evidenced by his negative charitable bequests predictions for some 
observation types (Boskin). 
Besides the McNees data, Boskin examines 1969 Federal Estate tax returns. 
Additional IRS information for the 1969 data allows Boskin to better specify the tax price 
via the approximation of state death (i.e., estate and inheritance) taxes. The federal estate 
tax price of charitable bequests is a determined by the dollar value of a decedent's estate. 
However, differences between state death taxes introduce differences between similar 
estate sizes if they are domiciled in separate states. 
Boskin primarily relies on three sources of variation to identify the tax price. 
These sources of variation include large sample size (e.g., 5,000 observations for the 
1957-1959 data), nonlinearity of the tax schedule, and wide tax brackets. The dependent 
variable in Boskin's Tobit regressions is the amount of charitable bequests, measured in 
thousands of dollars. 
Wealth is defined as the adjusted disposable estate which is equal to the gross 
estate less debts, expenses, and tax liability in the absence of charitable bequests. Boskin 
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discusses two possible definitions of tax price: last and first dollar. The last dollar tax 
price is computed with the marginal tax rate in effect if one additional dollar had been 
bequeathed to charity. Unfortunately, the last dollar tax price is simultaneously related to 
the size of charitable bequests. Therefore, Boskin's results are based on the first dollar 
tax price, which is the tax price of the first dollar given to charity. 
In Boskin's final 1957-1959 model specification, wealth is inelastic, 0.54. This 
model formulation increases the tax price flexibility by including three tax price terms: 
0.60 <; 0.60 < 0.80; and >0.80. The use of three price terms is supported by a likelihood 
ratio test that rejects all three price terms being equal. Elasticities for the price categories 
are as follows: -0.90 (0.60 <); -1.40 (0.60 < 0.80); and -1.8 (>0.80). The following 
demographic variables significantly decrease charitable bequests: being married, under 
sixty-five years old, trust usage, and young with dependents. Despite having a negative 
coefficient, the community property state variable is not significant. It is important to 
bear in mind; however, that being domiciled in a community property state is significant 
in Boskin's models that do not include the flexible tax price definition. 
When employing the 1969 data, the community property location and young with 
dependent variables are not included because of a lack of necessary information. Since 
Boskin finds married decedents leave significantly less charitable bequests, he constructs 
a married decedent's model. This married only model reveals that married decedents 
have higher tax price elasticities. 
Another 1969 model specification includes a percentage of liquid assets variable. 
As expected, this variable has a significant positive relationship with charitable bequests. 
The price elasticities of the three price terms in this model are as follows: -0.70 (0.60 <); 
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-1.70 (0.60 < 0.80); and -3.18 (>0.80). This model reduces the restrictive nature of the 
wealth parameter by including four separate wealth terms. The only wealth term with an 
elasticity exceeding unity is in estates greater than $1 million. The impact of the marital 
status and age variables remain consistent with previous model specifications. 
Joulfaian (2000b) 
Joulfaian (2000b) addresses whether the charitable deduction is a budget efficient 
tax policy by using federal estate tax returns for 11,915 individuals who departed life in 
1992. A stratified random sample is used with over representation of the rich and young. 
All decedents with gross estates exceeding $5 million or under the age of 40 are sampled. 
Joulfaian utilizes the disposable wealth measurement that is equal to net estate minus 
estate taxes due in the absence of charitable bequests. Thus, disposable wealth closely 
defines a decedent's budget constraint because it is the maximum amount that could be 
given to non-charitable entities. 
Decedent's age is coded as one of the following: under 45; 45<55; 55<65; 
65<75; 75<85; and over 85. Marital status is classified as married, widowed, 
single/never married, or divorced/separated. The percent of the estate comprised of 
business ownership enters the model as an indicator for bequest preference since a family 
business may be earmarked for the children. Geographical location of decedents is also 
controlled for by including the dummy variables North, Midwest, and South with the 
location of West serving as the baseline. 
Tobit regressions are performed on the dependent variable budget share allocated 
to charitable bequests which is equal to charitable bequests (less savings from the 
charitable bequest deduction) divided by disposable wealth. Employing the first dollar 
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price, 8 Joulfaian finds a significantly positive wealth coefficient with an elasticity of 
1.17. The tax price is significant negative with an elasticity of -2.5. Business share 
exhibits a negative relationship with charitable bequests. Married individuals leave less 
charitable bequests, while gender is not significant. Age is positively related to charitable 
bequests, with the most given by decedents at least 85 years old. Meanwhile, decedents 
located in the North and Midwest regions of the United States leave significantly more to 
charity. 
Noting that it is perhaps the more theoretically tax price, Joulfaian next uses the 
last dollar price. To reduce the endogeneity created by the last dollar tax price, the size 
of the charitable bequests and tax price are estimated simultaneously with the Fully 
Informative Maximum Likelihood (FIML) Tobit model. Explanatory variables in the last 
dollar tax price equation include the first dollar tax price as well as all of the independent 
variables from the Tobit model mentioned earlier except for the last dollar tax price. 
Under the FIML Tobit model, the tax price coefficient (-0.28) and elasticity (-1.70) 
estimates are smaller than under the first dollar Tobit model. The other coefficients, by 
contrast, remain relatively stable. Joulfaian also predicts that the repeal of the estate tax 
will reduce charitable bequests by twelve percent. 
Joulfaian f2005) 
Joulfaian (2005) demonstrates that it is problematic to group together widowed 
decedents who faced different tax price treatments of spousal bequests. Prior to 1982, 
tax-free bequests to a spouse were limited to 50% of the estate. Decedents departing life 
after 1981 are allowed an unlimited deduction for bequests to a spouse. Joulfaian notes 
that the Bakija et al. (2003) approach of excluding all married decedents may not 
8 Tax rates are a combination of the federal and state rates. 
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sufficiently address this problem. That is, the wealth of the surviving spouse is 
systematically impacted by which tax regime his/her spouse died in. Accordingly, the 
giving tendencies of surviving spouses may be directly impacted by whether his/her 
spouse died prior to 1982. As a result, Joulfaian limits his sample to 14,051 federal estate 
tax returns of decedents in years which the wealth of widowed decedents is consistently 
measured, 1976 and 1982. 
Joulfaian (2005) employs the same dependent variable as in Joulfaian (2000b), 
i.e., budget share allocated to charity.9 The wealth variable is defined as disposable 
wealth. Because last dollar tax price is determined by the size of charitable bequests (i.e., 
endogenous), it is instrumented with the first dollar price of charitable bequests. The 
instrumented tax price is equal to one minus the marginal tax price if all estates had left 
exactly $1,000 in charitable bequests. Marginal tax rates are derived at the date-of-death 
tax regime. FIML Tobit is utilized to perform the multivariate analysis with control 
variables (i.e., age, gender, and marital status) beyond tax price and wealth. 
Joulfaian (2005) reports that the log of the wealth and tax price variables are both 
significant.10 Significantly positive demographic variables include being single/divorced/ 
separated rather than widowed and age but at a declining rate. Meanwhile, males and 
decedents located in the South and West leave significantly less to charity. Also, the 
potential implications of decedents making bequest decisions upon the expected future 
estate tax rates is investigated by re-performing the model with the fully phased-in 
9 Joulfaian (2005) also performs multivariate analysis using an alternative measure of budget share as 
defined in Randolph (1995). However, I do not focus on this alternative budget share measure because 
while Joulfaian finds it produces qualitatively similar results, it has lower predictive power of average 
bequests. 
10 The elasticities for wealth and tax price are not reported by Joulfaian (2005) for the equations with the 
Joulfaian (2000b) dependent variable. 
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ERTA81 law that occurred in 1987. Utilizing the expected tax rates causes log of both 
the wealth and tax price variables to become more significant. 
Joulfaian (2005) predicts the change in charitable bequests when the estate tax is 
repealed for each decedent. As such, he compares the predicted value of each charitable 
bequest at the date-of-death tax rate versus the value predicted when estate tax rates equal 
zero. He estimates that charitable bequests will decline by thirteen percents. 
Summary of Federal Estate Tax 
Return Research 
Federal estate tax return inquiries use the Tobit model because of its econometric 
advantages over OLS models. Yet, no study to date tests the robustness of the Tobit 
model results to violations in the error distributions of homogeneity and/or normality. 
The current research addresses this void by examining the error distributions and explores 
the applicability of several potential remedies if either distribution assumption is violated. 
Although it is not exogenous, Joulfaian (2000b) suggests that the last dollar tax 
price is potentially the theoretically correct motivation of charitable bequests. Federal 
estate tax return researchers report that the instrumented last dollar tax price via the FIML 
Tobit model produces slightly different results. As such, in addition to using the first 
dollar tax price, reasons are provided as to why the testing of the last dollar tax price with 
an FIML Tobit model is not appropriate for the current study. 
Residence in a community property state is identified in Boskin (1976) as a 
deterrent for leaving charitable bequests, however, this variable was last tested thirty 
years ago. The majority of federal estate tax return research also includes state death 
taxes to improve the specification of the tax price of charitable bequests. Meanwhile, 
prior probate record research is restricted to single-state analysis. The present inquiry 
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bridges the gap between the two sets of research by examining probate records from two 
states with different state death tax structures. Furthermore, one state is a community 
property state (i.e., Louisiana) while the other is a common law state (i.e., Virginia), 
which provides updated evidence on this variable's impact in charitable bequest patterns. 
Joulfaian (2005) notes that a widow's wealth is systematically impacted by the tax 
regime his/her spouse died in. The biggest change in surviving spouse's wealth occurred 
in 1982 with the introduction of the unlimited marital deduction. Nevertheless, this 
limitation is most likely mitigated in the current study by the fact that at least eighteen 
years have passed if a decedent did become widowed before the introduction of the 
unlimited marital deduction. Thus, compounding effect of the events that occurred since 
they became widowed probably reduce the direct impact of limited spousal bequests. 
Federal estate tax return research states that inferences regarding the significance 
and elasticity of variables are impacted by which tax regime the decedent is assumed to 
have made his/her charitable bequest decisions under. Consequently, this study assesses 
charitable bequest patterns under the date-of-death tax and expected future tax structures 
(i.e., marginal estate tax rates and exemption equivalent amounts). 
Probate Record Research 
Probate records are an alternative data source for empirical researchers examining 
the effects of estate taxes upon charitable bequests. There are three advantages to using 
probate records rather than federal estate tax returns. First, probate records are easily 
accessible because they are public documents. Conversely, federal estate tax returns are 
confidential information. Second, probate records accommodate inferences over a larger 
wealth distribution of decedents. That is, observations within federal estate tax return 
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studies are limited to decedents with gross estates equal to or larger than the federal estate 
tax filing requirement. Meanwhile, the probate record threshold is significantly lower. 
Third, probate records contain unique data. For example, the tax price in effect 
on the date-of-will might be more influential for charitable bequests than the date-of-
death tax prices. Probate records also report the number of surviving children. 
Barthold and Plotnick 
Barthold and Plotnick (1984) examine 1,050 wealthy Connecticut probate records 
from the 1930s and 1940s. The sample consists of 346 estates with charitable bequests. 
Their inquiry advances estate tax research by estimating the tax price of charitable 
bequest from data containing considerable cross-year variation. They also incorporate 
unique variables from the probate records that are not utilized by prior studies. 
Coincidently, Barthold and Plotnick are the first to report empirical evidence that the 
estate tax does not significantly impact charitable bequests. 
The sample period for Barthold and Plotnick contains several large federal estate 
tax law changes. The Connecticut inheritance tax rates also changed considerably during 
this period. As a result, persons with similar levels of wealth face unique tax prices if 
they depart from life in different years. Substantial cross-year variation provides 
Barthold and Plotnick with increased separation of the wealth and tax price effects. 
Probate data allows Barthold and Plotnick to control for two previously 
unaccounted for demographic variables within their Tobit regressions: religion and 
relatives. Four religious affiliation categories are utilized: Protestant, Catholic, Jewish 
and other or not available. Decedents with a religious preference leave significantly 
larger charitable bequests. At the same time, the charitable bequests are not significantly 
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different between the different religious affiliation categories. Charitable bequests are 
significantly less for decedents with a surviving spouse or children. Meanwhile, gender 
and the presence of grandchildren and other relatives are insignificant. 
Barthold and Plotnick calculate marginal tax rates as a function of the federal and 
Connecticut laws in effect during the year of death for each decedent.11 The first dollar is 
assumed to determine the marginal tax rate; hence the tax price is independent of the 
charitable bequest amount. Wealth is measured by the size of a decedent's gross estate. 
The first Tobit model specification is in logarithmic functional form. That is, 
charitable bequests, wealth, and tax price enter as logarithmic estimates. Wealth is highly 
significant but its elasticity is below unity, 0.44. Tax price, on the other hand, does not 
significantly influence charitable bequests. Linear specifications of the variables result in 
qualitatively similar findings. Although wealth becomes even more inelastic (i.e., 0.15), 
wealth and tax price remain significant and insignificant, respectively. 
As a result of immense changes occurring in the U.S. economy during the sample 
period, two dummy variables are added to another model to address the potential impact 
of different tax regimes. Specifically, the dummy variables are coded to separate the 
following temporal effects: pre-1932,1932-1942, and 1943. Demographic characteristics 
remain similar and the wealth term is still significantly positive. Most importantly, the 
tax price variable becomes marginally significant with elasticities of -0.75 and -0.81, 
under the linear and logarithmic models respectively. Nevertheless, Barthold and 
Plotnick state that they "place little faith" in temporally adjusted model because tax price 
is insignificant in all other models. 
11 Barthold and Plotnick do not perform analysis with the date of will tax prices. However, their results are 
not affected by the tax rates in effect two years prior to and five years after death. 
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Bennett 
Bennett (1990) analyzes 618 probate records from Harris County, Texas in the 
1970s and the 1980s. Charitable bequests are indicated in 84 probate records. The Tobit 
regression procedure is used to calculate the tax price and wealth elasticities for 
charitable bequests. 
A flexible tax price measurement is utilized by allowing tax price to enter the 
regression as three separate variables: 0.60 <; 0.60 < 0.80; >0.80. The wealth variable is 
defined by the net estate and in current dollars. Bennett relies on considerable cross-year 
variation in federal estate tax rates and the unified credit to reduce the collinearity 
between wealth and tax price variables. 
Results of the full sample reveal a significantly positive wealth variable and an 
elasticity of 0.502. Meanwhile, the price terms are all significantly negative with 
following elasticities: 0.60< (-3.01); 0.60<0.80 (-2.65); >0.80 (-2.90). As such, Bennett 
states that the deductibility of charitable bequest initiates more bequests than is lost in tax 
revenue. Demographic control variables indicate that being younger than sixty-five, 
having children, and married, significantly decreases charitable bequests. 
The Tobit model is performed on a restricted sample of married decedents to 
garner additional information on the marital status role in charitable bequests. Although 
Bennett notes that the married subsample is not influenced by the tax price, the elasticity 
for each tax price variable exceeds minus one (i.e., -1.08, -1.98, and -2.43, respectively). 
Tobit regressions are also performed with the wealth and charitable bequest variables 
deflated by the GNP price, using 1970 as the base year. Results of the deflated 
regressions are qualitatively similar to the preceding tests. 
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In the final Tobit regression formulation, adjusted disposable estate (i.e., net 
estate in the absence of charitable bequests) is used to measure wealth. Bennett suggests 
that adjusted disposable estate is potentially a more accurate assessment of a decedent's 
opportunity to make charitable bequests. Additionally, the effect of wealth is measured 
by three estate size variables: < $100,000; $100,000 < $1,000,000; and > $1,000,000. 
There is little variation between the wealth term elasticities; however the largest wealth 
term does have the greatest elasticity. The direction of coefficients and elasticities for the 
remaining variables are consistent with previously discussed results. Bennett also 
considers how eliminating the estate tax would impact charitable bequests. She estimates 
a 59.1% reduction in charitable bequests in the absence of an estate tax. 
Brunetti 
Brunetti (2005) examines 5,650 San Francisco probate records from 1980-1982. 
Approximately 13.8 percent of the decedents in the sample made charitable bequests. An 
objective of Brunetti is to test the validity of extant literature assumptions used to reduce 
collinearity between the wealth and tax price terms. For instance, variation is often 
induced into the tax price term by selecting the marginal tax rate after deducting the 
spousal bequests of married decedents. This method is premised on marital bequests 
being determined prior to charitable bequests, i.e., exogenous spousal bequests. 
Another assumption is that bequests are determined by the date-of-death tax 
regime, nevertheless, bequests might be influenced by the tax regime effective on the 
date-of-will. Fortunately, probate records include the date-of-will and the last will 
revision date, if any. Brunetti creates four tax price variables, each consisting of a unique 
combination of these two assumptions. For example, date-of-death tax rate assuming 
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predetermined spousal bequests. In addition to the reported first dollar tax price results, 
he states that similar findings occur with an instrumented last dollar tax price. 
Brunetti's dependent variable is charitable bequest divided by wealth. The 
measure of wealth is defined as net estate less the tax liability if decedents did not leave 
charitable bequests. Extent of a decedent's estate tax planning is gauged by a dummy 
variable coded as " 1 " if the decedent left a property in a trust and zero if there is no trust 
utilized. Religious membership is coded as " 1 " when funeral records mention a religious 
service and zero if no religious affiliation is indicated. Lack of liquidity is controlled for 
with a business share explanatory variable. Other demographic variables are marital 
status, gender, age, and number of children. 
Date-of-Death. The first set of Tobit regressions in Brunetti use the date-of-
death tax schedule tax price and is performed on the filers subsample. These filers 
consist of all decedents required to file federal estate tax returns because his/her gross 
estate size is equal to or larger than the federal filing requirement. Several specifications 
of the model are made within this first set of regressions, including those designed to 
reduce the impact of the nonlinear tax schedule by including combinations of polynomial 
wealth terms, indicators for each wealth quintile, and a wealth and price interaction term. 
Under the linear wealth term model formulation, tax price is significant (-1.34 
elasticity) and wealth is insignificant (1.04 elasticity). A negative relationship exists 
between charitable bequests and being married, number of children, and business share of 
the estate. Meanwhile, charitable bequests are positively influenced by belonging to an 
organized religion. The trust use, age, and gender variables are not significant. Age is 
thereby not included in the subsequent models. Re-performing the first model after 
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removing the age variable produces similar results except wealth is significant. Model 
formulations with nonlinear wealth effects create comparable estimates; however, the 
price elasticity does decrease slightly. 
The second group of Tobit regressions is modeled with the non-filer subsample. 
These decedents have a gross estate value below the federal estate tax filing 
requirements. Brunetti notes that this analysis provides insight into an often over looked 
section of wealth distribution because prior studies use only federal estate tax return data 
or probate records of very wealthy decedents. Tax price and wealth estimates are 
highly significant and elasticities range from -6.16 to -5.72 and 0.75 to 1.19, 
respectively.13 It is important to bear in mind that the elasticities for the tax price 
variable are considerably greater for the non-filer than filer decedents. Trust usage and 
belonging to a religious organization are significantly positive. Conversely, being 
married and the number of children are significantly negative variables. Both the gender 
and share of business assets variables are insignificant. 
Date-of-Will. Brunetti reports that several patterns emerge for the filers 
subsample when regressions employ the date-of-will instead of the date-of-death 
structure and incorporating all previously discussed control variables except age. First, 
adding higher order wealth terms increases (decreases) the wealth (tax price) elasticities. 
This implies that under (over) estimation may occur for the wealth (tax price) elasticities 
if nonlinear wealth terms are not included. Second, the form of polynomial wealth 
specification has little impact on elasticities. Consequently, the nonlinear wealth effect is 
sufficiently addressed by including a quadratic wealth term. 
12 Bennett (1990) is the exception to this statement. 
13 Brunetti (2005) estimates the standard errors of the elasticities with the delta method. 
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Third, wealth elaticities usually exceed unity. Fourth, elasticities for both wealth 
and tax price under the date-of-will tax rate are comparable to that of date-of-death when 
the filing status (i.e., above or below filing threshold) is assumed to be the date-of-will 
status. Alternatively, the date-of-will price elasticities increase substantially (i.e., 
between -2.54 and -2.38) and wealth elasticities become insignificant when the date-of-
death filing status is relied on. 
Performing preceding analysis in the non-filers subgroup indicates that the 
nonlinear wealth terms increase the price elasticity estimates. Date-of-death tax rates 
produce significant (insignificant) the price elasticity estimates under the date-of-will 
(date-of-death) filing status assumptions. Also, evidence of the relative importance of the 
tax regime assumptions is assessed by including both date-of-will and date-of-death tax 
prices in the same regression. Once again, the date-of-will price elasticity is greater. 
Further Models. Although the primary focus of Brunetti is on contrasting the 
results of filers and non-filers, he does report elasticities for the entire sample. Each tax 
price and wealth elasticity for the entire sample is statistically significant. Nonetheless, 
all elasticities for the entire sample are below unity. 
Another regression model is formulated with a subsample of decedents who 
revised their will in the year of death. This sample contains the lowest measurement 
error in tax price unless they assumed future tax prices. Resulting tax price and wealth 
elasticities are large and significant for both the filers and non-filers subgroups, except 
for the wealth elasticity of non-filers. 
Instead of determining the distribution of bequests based on date-of-will or date-
of-death tax rates, decedents may also compute the bequest via expected tax rates. 
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Consequently, Brunetti uses the folly phased-in tax schedule of the Economics Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 (i.e., ERTA-1981) if the decedent died on or after its passage on August 
13, 1981. Once again, charitable bequests are significantly impacted by tax price and 
wealth. Nevertheless, compared to the date-of-death and date-of-will tax prices, 
elasticities are much smaller (slightly larger) for tax price (wealth). 
Pre-determined Spousal Bequests. Potential bias in prior studies employing 
predetermined spousal bequests is investigated by including this assumption as a source 
of variation. The resulting tax price and wealth elasticities are similar to estimates 
attained without the spousal bequest assumption. Accordingly, there is no evidence that 
bias exists in prior studies employing the predetermined spousal bequest assumption. 
At the same time, a lack of bias does not substantiate spousal bequests as being 
predetermined. Therefore, the price of spousal bequests14 is included as an explanatory 
variable and is significant. Spouse price and charity price are also significant explanatory 
variables in a regression with the dependent variable being the spousal bequests divided 
by wealth. Hence, there is evidence that spousal bequests are not predetermined. As 
such, predetermined spousal bequest models are misspecified. 
Brunetti concludes by estimating the impact of EGTRRA on charitable bequests. 
Specifically, how will charitable bequests change when there is no longer an 
accompanying tax price incentive. He employs a quadratic model with the date-of-death 
tax price in the predictions for each decedent. The un-weighted average of these 
predicted values over all decedents is reported, and suggests that filers' charitable 
bequests will decrease by 4%. 
14 The unlimited marital deduction was only in effect during the last one-third of Brunetti's sample period. 
Therefore, his sample contains the variation necessary to compute a spousal bequest tax price. 
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Summary of Probate Record Research 
Probate researchers find that the assumption regarding which tax regime (i.e., 
date-of-death, date-of-will, or expected future) motivates charitable bequests has 
important implications. That is, the elasticity of tax prices and overall effect of repealed 
estate taxes are sensitive to the tax rate structure assumption. This study reports results 
under all three tax rate assumptions. 
Sources of tax price variation are necessary to delineate the tax price from wealth 
effect in charitable bequests. Consistent with prior probate research, the current study 
utilizes inheritance tax law changes as an additional source of tax price variation. Further 
sources of variation are gained through the changes in the federal estate tax equivalent 
exemption level and top marginal tax rates. 
Brunetti finds that differences exist between filers and non-filers. Since the 
federal exemption equivalent has increased significantly, a larger portion of the wealth 
distribution is no longer filing federal estate tax returns. Also, the most recent probate 
data on non-filers is twenty years old. This research inquiry fills these voids with an 
analysis of recent non-filer decedents. 
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study assesses whether deductible charitable bequests are a budget efficient 
policy for estate tax purposes. Making such an inference requires computing the 
elasticity of the tax price variable resulting from a bequest demand equation. 
Traditionally, this elasticity is based on the Tobit model tax price estimate that is 
formulated to handle an abundance of dependent variables with zero observations. 
Unfortunately, the Tobit model relies on restrictive error distribution assumptions that 
may not be appropriate for charitable bequest data. Accordingly, the present study 
analyzes the error distributions and examines potential remedies if they are violated. The 
motivation for and execution of methodological considerations employed in this research 
endeavor are demonstrated in this chapter. That is, research questions, research sample 
construction, potential variables, and model formulations are discussed. Furthermore, 
assumption tests for the model formulations are also provided. 
Research Questions 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the following research questions are assessed to garner 
a clearer understanding of the estate tax impact on charitable bequests. 
1. Is the deductibility of charitable bequests a budget efficient tax policy? That is, 




2. Is the wealth elasticity above unity? 
3. Does a decedent's domicile significantly affect charitable bequests? 




Federal estate tax returns and probate records both contain information regarding 
charitable bequest patterns. The present study samples probate records because federal 
estate tax returns are confidential. Moreover, important information, such as the date-of-
the-will, is exclusively available in probate records. Testate probate records include a 
decedent's testament/will that controls the distribution of his/her assets. Conversely, if a 
decedent does not leave a will, he/she is classified as dying intestate. Under these 
circumstances, state law establishes the order that the decedent's assets are distributed. 
Since this research inquiry is exclusively interested in testate probate records, such files 
are referenced as probate records hereafter. 
In addition to a decedent's will, probate records contain demographic information 
such as age,15 domicile,16 and date of death. Financial information regarding the 
decedent is also included; however, the form of this information is contingent on a 
decedent's location and time of death. For example, probate records for Louisiana 
decedents include a Detailed Descriptive List of Property that reports a decedent's assets, 
15 Age is not always reported in the Virginia probate records. For these cases, the decedent's age is 
obtained from Ancestry.com which provides obituaries, a social security death index, and public records. 
16 The current study is restricted to decedents domiciled in either Louisiana or Virginia because non-
resident probate records are not expected to accurately reflect a decedent's financial status. 
41 
debts, and liabilities.17 Furthermore, probate records for Louisiana decedents dying prior 
to July 1, 2004, include a Louisiana Inheritance Tax Return. These inheritance tax 
returns list all immovable property and all tangible movable property physically located 
in Louisiana and all intangible moveable property wherever it is situated. 
Virginia probate records include an inventory that reports the fair market value of 
a decedent's personal estate under the executor's control, interest in any financial 
institution multiple party non-survivorship account, and any real estate that is an asset of 
the decedent's estate.19 Assets that are discovered after the filing of the inventory are 
17 According to the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3031, a succession (i.e., transfer of wealth to 
a decedent's successors) must be opened for every Louisiana decedent. However, an administration can be 
avoided if the following conditions are met. First, all legatees are either competent or acting through legal 
representatives. Second, all legatees accept the succession. Last, none of the creditors of the succession 
have demanded its administration. See Revels et al. (2007). 
18 Property excluded from inheritance tax returns include any proceeds receivable by any beneficiary, other 
than the decedent's estate, under a life insurance policy or retirement or pension plan. Nonetheless, the 
inheritance tax return does include items that are not subject to probate such as a living revocable trust. 
19 Property specifically excluded are joint-held assets such as real estate, brokerage accounts, and stock 
certificates held jointly by the decedent and another person, persons, with the right of survivorship or held 
by the decedent and the decedent's spouse as tenants by the entirety, and assets passing by way of a 
survivorship provision, a payable on death provision, or a transform of death provision. The same is true 
for money payable under a beneficiary designation contained in a life insurance policy, IRA, pension, or 
other arrangement unless the estate is the beneficiary. 
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recorded on an Account for Decedent's Estate (Account). Furthermore, receipts and 
payments made in the administration of a decedent's estate are recorded in the Account.21 
As a result of these differences between the federal estate tax laws and state 
inheritance and probate laws, the taxable estate estimates solely from probate records 
may not equate the taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes. Accordingly, this study 
imputes the taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes from estate tax payment 
amounts recorded in the probate records. 
Sample Locations 
This research inquiry examines a stratified random sample of 900 probate records 
in Louisiana and Virginia between the years 2000 and 2005. The Louisiana probate 
records are collected from Lincoln Parish and Rapides Parish. The probate records from 
Virginia are attained from Arlington County because it has a comparable population to 
the combined populations of Lincoln and Rapides Parishes. Arlington County Virginia is 
also chosen because its probate records are available on-line. 
If the estate remains open for longer than six months, additional Accounts must be filed as long as the 
estate is being administered. Moreover, Virginia Code Section 26-20.1 allows for a statement in lieu of a 
detailed account to be filed if each of the residual beneficiaries is also a personal representative. The 
current study does not analyze probate records that contain a statement in lieu of a detailed account because 
it is not possible to determine the amount of a decedent's debts and expenses. Thus, the decedent's 
marginal tax rate cannot be calculated. 
21 
Unfortunately, the Account combines income and expenses that need to be separated between the estate 
tax return and the estate fiduciary income tax return. For instance, the first Account reports dividends 
received one day after the date of death, which most likely is included in a decedent's gross estate. 
Meanwhile, the first Account will also report dividends received four months after a decedent's death; 
these dividends are fiduciary income and are not includible in the decedent's gross estate. As a result, the 
current study established the following rules to allocate the Accounting receipts and payments between the 
decedent and the fiduciary. First, all Account income receipts received within five days after the 
decedent's death are added to the decedent's gross estate. Second, first Account payments (except for 
estate tax payments) are classified as being deductible on the decedents estate tax return. Payments on 
subsequent Accountings are considered to be deductible for the fiduciary. The payments are given a longer 
period to be related to the decedent because the inventory is intended to capture the majority of income 
owed to the decedent at their death. 
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Descriptive statistics from the U.S. Census (2000) for the sample locations are 
reported in Table 3.1. Although the population is larger in Arlington Virginia (hereafter 
Virginia), the death rates in the Louisiana Parishes (hereafter Louisiana) is higher. Thus, 
the number of probate records per year is similar. The percent of population 65 years or 
older is larger (smaller) than the national average in Louisiana (Virginia), respectively. 
Conversely, the median household income is larger (smaller) than the national average in 
Virginia (Louisiana), respectively. Virginia has a lower portion of their population below 
the poverty level than the national average while Louisiana has more. 
Table 3.1 Comparison of Sample Locations 
Demographic Variable 
2000 Population 
Death rate per 1,000 residents 
Percent of population > 65 years old 
Median household income ($1997) 


































Estimates from the maximum likelihood estimation process contain the 
asymptotic properties of efficiency, normality, and consistency. Unfortunately, the 
properties of small samples are less established. Long (1997, 53) asks: When is the 
sample large enough to use maximum likelihood estimates and the resulting tests? As 
general guidance, Long recommends that there should be at least 10 observations per 
parameter. In addition, there are other reasons as to why the sample size may need to be 
increased such as high collinearity among variables. Accordingly, 900 observations are 
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collected for the present study. The sample is taken evenly between Louisiana and 
Virginia and over the six year period from 2000-2005. As a result, 75 observations are 
sampled each year within each state. 
Choice Based Sampling 
The purpose of this research inquiry is to analyze how charitable bequests are 
impacted by changes in death taxes. Therefore, a choice-based sampling procedure is 
employed with charitable bequest probate records sampled at a higher rate (i.e., 100%) 
than their true proportion of the population (approximately 5%). Choice-based sampling 
is utilized for two reasons. First, in the absence of extremely large samples, a random 
sample of data containing an infrequently occurring observation of particular interest 
(i.e., charitable bequest) provides relatively imprecise parameter estimates (Dopuch et al. 
1987). Second, time and resource constraints are not sufficient to allow for the recording 
of each probate record. 
The choice-base sampling procedure is conducted as follows. First, all charitable 
bequest records are automatically sampled. Next, the number of charitable bequest 
probate records within each state during each year is subtracted from seventy-five. For 
example, if there are 15 Louisiana charitable bequest observations for the year 2000, then 
60 non-charitable bequest records are sampled in Louisiana for the year 2000. 
Third, the charitable bequest records for each location and year are categorized as 
either filers or non-filers. The classification of filers vs. non-filers is based on whether 
the gross estate is above the federal equivalent exemption amount. Subsequently, the 
number of charitable bequest estates that are classified as filers and non-filers are divided 
by the total number of charitable bequest estates. The resulting proportions for filers and 
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non-filers are multiplied by the number of non-charitable bequest observations needed to 
bring the total sample size up to seventy-five. Finally, a random sample is taken of both 
filer and non-filer estates without charitable bequests to satisfy the number calculated in 
the previous step. 
Research Methods 
Multivariate analysis is utilized to ascertain the impact death taxes have on 
charitable bequests while controlling for important demographic variables. Similar to 
Joulfaian (2000b, 2005), the following equation is estimated for each decedent i: 
BSACBi =j30+/3p\nPi+/]Jnwi+Plocloci+yZi+si (1) 
where BSACB is the observed Budget Share Allocated to Charitable Bequests 
and is measured as follows: 
BSACB = [CB-^~T^ (2) 
(W-T0) 
where CB is the actual amount of charitable bequests and T is the actual amount of death 
taxes paid. Charitable bequests tax price is defined as variable p. The variable w is 
disposable wealth, W-To. That is, net estate (i.e., W) less the tax liability computed by 
setting charitable bequests equal to zero (i.e., To).22 A decedent's location is defined 
through the variable he which has Louisiana decedents coded as " 1 " and Virginia 
22 Formula (1) follows Joulfaian (2000b, 2005) by performing the log transformation on the independent 
variables of tax price (p) and disposable wealth (w) but not the dependent variable of budget share (w). 
Brunetti (2005) does not apply the log transformation to his dependent variable (budget share) or any of the 
independent variables, however, does utilize polynomial terms for disposable wealth. Bennett (1990) does 
not utilize log transformations; rather, tax price and disposable wealth enter the model within three separate 
size categories to model nonlinear effects. The dependent variable in Bennett (1990) is the dollar value of 
charitable bequests. Barthold and Plotnick (1984) employ the log transformation on the independent 
variables of gross estate and tax price as well as the dependent variable (i.e., charitable bequests + 1). 
Boskin (1976) does not use log transformations on the adjusted disposable estate, tax price, or his 
dependent variable of charitable bequests. 
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decedents taking on the value of zero. Table 3.2 presents a list of all, including 
demographic control, variables that are utilized in this study. 
Table 3.2 Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Business Share Allocated to Charitable 
Bequests (BSACB) 
Charitable Bequests Tax Price (i.e., p) 
Disposable Wealth (i.e., w) 








= 1.00 - Marginal tax rate 
= W-T 0 
= 1 if a Louisiana decedent; 
= 0 if a Virginia decedent 
= Overall business ownership / Gross estate 
= The number of surviving children 
= Age of the decedent 
= 1 if decedent is a male; 
= 0 if decedent is a female 
= 1 if decedent utilizes a trust; 
=0 if decedent does not utilize a trust 
= 1 if decedent is married; 
= 0 if decedent is not married Notes: 
*CB is equal to the amount of charitable bequests. T is equal to the decedent's actual tax liability while 
T0 is equal to the decedent's tax liability setting charitable bequests equal to zero. W is equal to the 
decedent's net estate. 
The sample consists of 900 probate records from Louisiana and Virginia during 
the period 2000-2005. A choice-based sampling technique is utilized to ensure that the 
sample incorporates two features. First, the sample includes the maximum number of 
charitable bequest probate records possible because they are the observations of the 
highest interest. Second, the portion of the sample comprised of filers is the same for 
non-charitable bequest observations as it is for charitable bequest decedents. Analysis is 
performed on the entire sample as well as the filers and non-filers sub-samples. 
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Model Specification 
Previous charitable bequest research employs the Tobit model; however, no 
evidence is provided as to whether the underlying error distributions are homogeneous 
and normal. If the error distribution violates either of these assumptions, the Tobit model 
estimates are inconsistent. Therefore, the error distribution of this study's data is tested 
for homogeneity and normality. Several remedies are explored when the error 
distribution deviates from either of these assumptions. 
Abundance of Zero Observations. Empirical researchers in demand analysis 
often encounter an abundance of zero observations on the dependent variable. For 
example, this problem is present when investigating the demand for tobacco (Jones 
1992), alcohol (Yen and Jensen 1996), meat (Newman et al. 2001), child care (Joesch and 
Hiedemann 2002), and charitable bequests (Brunetti 2005). 
Econometric techniques used by charitable giving and bequest researchers to 
address the many zeros problem have continuously evolved. McNees (1973) performs 
OLS exclusively on charitable bequest observations. Unfortunately, the systematic 
removal of these observations "throws away" information (Kennedy 2005, 283). 
Furthermore, employing OLS strictly on the subset of non-zero dependent variable 
observations produces biased and inconsistent estimators (Gujarati 2003). 
Boskin and Feldstein (1977) add a small sum to the dependent variables prior to 
estimating a log-log version of the demand function on the entire sample. This 
methodology has the shortcoming of implying that all zero observations arise from either 
misreporting or infrequency of expenditure, which precludes the possibility that they are 
a corner solution (Jones and Posnett 1991). 
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Tobit Model. Similar to other arenas of censored data economic research, 23 
charitable bequest studies currently employ the Tobit model. Proposed by Tobin (1958), 
the Tobit model is a censored regression model where the dependent variable, yj, 
observations are censored if they are below a lower limit value, Li. The vector of 
independent variables is represented by X{. For the purposes of this study, the lower limit 
value is zero because it is not possible to leave negative charitable bequests.24 Since the 
dependent variable of the current study (i.e., BSACB) is a proportion, it is necessary to 
use a two-limit Tobit model. In addition to the lower limit of zero, the two-limit Tobit 
model has an upper limit value, L2, which is equal to 100% in the current study because 
this is the maximum portion of a decedent's wealth given to charitable organizations. As 




The latent variable y* is related to the actual observed yj by the following relationship: 
y, = U if y]<0, (4) 
= y] i fLi< j * <L2 , 
= L2 if yt > L2 otherwise. 
Consequently, the limited dependent variable takes on the value of zero when the 
latent variable y* falls below the lower limit. Likewise, a value of one is assigned to the 
limited dependent variable if it falls above the upper limit. On the other hand, when 
greater than zero but less than one, the latent variable y* is equal to the observed 
See Amemiya (1984) for a comprehensive overview of the various categories of Tobit model research. 
The lower limit value is usually zero (Maddala 1991); however, the lower limit can take on any value. 
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dependent variable value. As noted in Maddala (1991), the following maximum 
likelihood function can be used to formulate the parameters (3 and cr: 
L(p,a|yi,Xi,Lii, L2i) (5) 
= n o 
yi=Li 
(L.-Px.\ 1. 
I i« ^ r ' n - ^ 
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where ^(-) is the univariate density function and <&(•) is the univariate 
standard normal cumulative distribution function. Amemiya (1973) demonstrates 
that the Tobit parameters are efficient and consistent when computed with the maximum 
likelihood estimation process. The two-limit Tobit (hereafter Tobit) model specification 
and estimation procedures assume a homogeneous and normal distribution of the error 
terms. 
Homogeneity. Maximum likelihood estimates are inconsistent for limited 
dependent variables models if the homogeneity assumption of errors is violated 
(Arabmazar and Schmidt 1981). The current study uses the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
test as described in Greene (2003) to test for homogeneity. When there is a violation of 
homogeneity, the Heteroscedasticity Tobit model (H-Tobit) is estimated using the 
exponential specification of the error variance (Greene). 
Normality. The maximum likelihood estimation produces inconsistent estimates 
for limited dependent variable models if the normality assumption of errors is violated 
(Arabmazar and Schmidt 1982). This study tests for normality with the LM test 
formulated in Chesher and Irishand (1987) as described in Greene (2003). If non-
normality is indicated by the LM test, the present research will examine the 
appropriateness of potential remedies. 
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Research Question 1 
The present study assesses whether the deductibility of charitable bequests is a 
budget efficient tax policy. That is, does the tax-free status of charitable bequests 
stimulate more funds for not-for-profit organizations than is lost in tax revenue? The 
deductibility of charitable bequests is budget efficient when the tax price elasticity 
exceeds an absolute value of one. 
Tax Price. Delineating the wealth and tax price effects is essential when 
assessing whether charitable bequests are influenced by estate taxes. Unfortunately, 
separating the wealth and tax price tax effects is difficult because the tax price is a 
function of wealth. After all, the tax price of charitable bequests is equal to one minus 
the marginal tax rate. Simultaneously, the marginal tax rate is contingent upon the estate 
size, i.e., wealth. The key to isolating the effects of wealth and tax price is finding 
sources of variation within the tax prices of decedents of similar wealth. 
Kopczuk and Slemrod (2003) note that the tax price identification is easier if 
estates of equal wealth are compared in different tax regimes. As such, the current study 
relies on sources of tax price variation from temporal changes in federal estate taxes and 
exemption equivalent, differences in state death taxes, marital deduction, and broad tax 
brackets. Consistent with the majority of prior literature, the tax price coefficient is 
expected to be significantly negative. 
Sources of Tax Price Variation. The data employed in this research inquiry has 
several sources of variation. For instance, the sample period extends over six years when 
the federal estate tax exemption equivalent increased twice. The net effect of these 
changes caused the exemption equivalent to increase from $675,000 to $1,500,000. In 
51 
addition, the maximum federal estate tax rate decreased from 55% to 47%. The date-of-
will tax price also includes variation because the estate tax structure changed in periods 
prior to 2000. 
Besides the variation created at the federal level, there are four sources of state 
tax-price variation. First, Louisiana collected an inheritance tax until July 1, 2004. As a 
result, Louisiana decedents with equal wealth have a different tax price as long as they do 
not have mirror image bequest patterns to a spouse, heirs, and charitable organizations. 
Second, the Louisiana inheritance tax was slowly phased out between July 1, 1998, and 
June 30, 2004. As such, Louisiana decedents with similar wealth levels and bequest 
patterns face different tax prices during this four and a half year period. Third, Virginia 
does not administer an inheritance tax. Thus, the decedents of Virginia and Louisiana of 
equal wealth levels have different tax-prices from January 1, 2000, through June 30, 
2004. Broad tax brackets also induce variation because they assess a constant tax rate on 
decedents with a wide range of wealth. Fourth, Virginia collected estate taxes during the 
entire sample period while Louisiana did not collect estate taxes during 2005. 
The Louisiana inheritance tax complicates the computation of its decedent's 
marginal tax rates. As mentioned in the first chapter, inheritance tax rates are determined 
by how much each classification of heirs or legatees receives. Consequently, a weighted 
average is constructed of the marginal tax rates that non-charity heirs would have paid in 
the absence of the charitable bequests while holding each heir's after-tax estate 
proportion constant. However, alternative formulations are made for those decedents 
who gave their entire estate to charitable organizations. If these decedents had children, 
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the marginal tax rate of the direct descendents is used. Otherwise, the non-related 
person's marginal tax rate is employed. 
Consistent with the majority of prior research (e.g., Joulfaian 2000b, 2005), the 
predetermined marital deduction is used as a source of variation between married and 
unmarried decedents. That is, the marginal tax rate for married decedents is computed 
after subtracting the spousal bequest. Brunetti (2005) states the predetermined spousal 
bequest assumption does not necessarily bias results. However, Brunetti also finds that 
predetermined spousal bequest may create an incorrect model specification due to a lack 
of evidence that the spousal bequest was determined prior to the charitable bequest. 
Nonetheless, the current study utilizes the predetermined marital deduction because its 
contribution of tax price variation is deemed to outweigh the potential model 
misspecification if the final results are not biased. 
First vs. Last Dollar Tax Price. The tax price is equal to one minus the 
marginal tax rate. There are two methods for computing the marginal tax rate. The first 
dollar tax price assumes that the correct marginal tax rate is the one applicable after the 
first dollar of charitable bequests is given. Alternatively, the last dollar tax price uses the 
marginal tax rate that is effective after reducing the estate by the last dollar of charitable 
bequests. Because the first dollar tax price is independent of the charitable bequest, it is 
frequently used in prior research (e.g., Boskin 1976; Barthold and Plotnick 1984; and 
Joulfaian 1991). 
Joulfaian (2000b) states that the last dollar tax price might be more theoretically 
correct. Consequently, he performs analysis under both the first and last dollar tax price. 
Joulfaian (2000b) finds that the last dollar tax price coefficient and elasticity are smaller 
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than their first dollar counterparts; however, they remain significantly negative. Brunetti 
(2005) tests the last dollar tax price with the instrumental variable methodology. 
However, he exclusively reports the first dollar tax price regressions because his last 
dollar tax price conclusions are similar to the first dollar tax price findings. Joulafaian 
(2005) exclusively employs the last dollar tax price instrumented using the first dollar tax 
price on charitable bequests. 
Notwithstanding the potential for theoretical improvements of the last dollar tax 
price, the current study employs the first dollar tax price for three reasons. First, the 
current study is unable to identify an independent variable that would allow for a model 
specification to address the inherent endogeneity of the last dollar tax price. Joulfaian 
(2000b, 2005) use the Fully Informative Maximum Likelihood (FIML) Tobit model to 
estimate the last dollar tax price. Unfortunately, at least one exclusion restriction is 
required for an FIML model (Bratti et al. 2004). An exclusion restriction is defined by 
Bradley et al. (2005) as having one independent variable in the FIML's first equation that 
is related to the first equation's dependent variable but is not correlated with the FIML's 
second equation's dependent variable. This requirement does not hold for Joulfaian who 
utilizes the following FIML Tobit equations: 
InPL = 5PlnPF + 5wlnW + 5X'X + u2 (6) 
S = alnPL + pinW + Y'X + ui (7) 
where: 
S = Charitable Bequests / Disposable Wealth 
PL = LDTP 
W = Wealth 
X = Control variables 
PF = FDTP 
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Specifically, IIIPF (first dollar tax price) is the only independent variable in 
equation (6) that is not in equation (7). However, the IIIPF variable does not meet the 
exclusion restriction requirements because it is correlated with equation (7)'s dependent 
variable (budget share allocated to charitable bequests). Second, the first dollar tax price 
is exogenous to the size of a decedent's charitable bequest. Third, the majority of prior 
studies report first dollar tax price results, making this study's results more comparable. 
Tax Rate Structure Assumptions. Clotfelter (1985, 240) notes that sample 
periods containing frequent changes in estate tax rates will probably infuse error into the 
price term. That is, frequent changes make it difficult to ascertain which rates are 
influencing bequest decisions. Three tax rate structures can be assumed to stimulate a 
testator's bequest motives. In chronological order, they are the death rate structure in 
effect on the date-of-will, date-of-death, and the expected-date-of-death. While all estate 
tax research is able to test the date-of-death tax rates, only probate records provide the 
date-of-will information. The tax price at the decedents' expected date of death is 
computed using the United States Life Tables from the National Vital Statistics Reports 
(NVSR) (Arias 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2007a, 2007b).25 
Although, it is generally unclear if the testator's charitable bequests are based on 
the date-of-will or date-of-death tax regime, there is no debate if the will is revised in the 
year of death. Thus, another model is based on this unique sub-sample because these 
decedents are clearly not motivated by past tax rates. 
The expected date of death dates for 2005 decedents are based on the 2004 NVSR table (Arias 2007b) 
because 2005 was not available. 
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Elasticity of Tax Price. This study follows Joulfaian (2000b, 2005) to evaluate 
elasticities using the mean BSACB and the mean of z. That is, the tax price elasticity is 
equal to: 
n= Hp 3>(z)-l (8) 
p BSACB 
where O (z) is the probability of charitable bequests being positive. The elasticity of the 
tax price is expected to be greater than -1.00. 
Research Question 2 
The estate tax creates two conflicting impacts upon charitable bequests. Research 
question two addresses the tax price incentive to leave more charitable bequests. On the 
other hand, the wealth available for charitable organizations is less when estate taxes are 
paid on the portion of the estate bequeathed to non-exempt entities (i.e., anyone except a 
spouse or charitable organization). Accordingly, it is important to ascertain whether 
wealth's elasticity is greater than unity. 
Wealth. Naturally, there is a positive relationship between a decedent's ability to 
leave a charitable bequest and the size of their estate. At the same time, estate taxes 
lower a decedent's disposable wealth if a portion of the estate is left to anyone except a 
spouse or charitable organization. Thus, Joulfaian (2005, 3) notes that large wealth 
elasticities indicate a "dampening effect on giving" by the existence of the estate tax. For 
this reason, it is necessary to include the decedent's wealth as an explanatory variable in 
the charitable bequest equation. Pursuant to Joulfaian (2005), wealth is defined as the 
disposable wealth (i.e., W - To). 
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Elasticity of Wealth. This study follows Joulfaian (2000b, 2005) to evaluate 
elasticities using the mean BSACB and the mean of z. Specifically, wealth elasticity is 
equal to: 
?jw= P" 0(z) + l (9) 
w BSACB 
The elasticity of wealth is expected to be greater than unity. 
Research Question 3 
The present study investigates the effects of changes in death taxes for residents 
of Louisiana and Virginia. Performing analysis over two states increases this inquiry's 
generality over previous single-state probate record endeavors. Examination of a single-
state prevents prior probate record research from investigating the differences between 
community and non-community property states.26 This inquiry, by contrast, examines 
probate records from a community (i.e., Louisiana) and non-community (i.e., Virginia) 
property state. In community property states, married decedents are required to report 
half of the wealth attained during marriage as their own. This systematic impact on the 
wealth variable could have important estate tax implications. As such, Boskin (1976) 
finds that community property decedents make significantly less charitable bequests 
under all model specifications except the least restrictive price term formulation. 
Geographical differences may also create difference in bequest patterns. 
Joulfaian (2000b) reports that significantly more charitable bequests are given by 
decedents located in the North and Midwest regions of the United States. Meanwhile, 
Joulfaian (2005) finds decedents located in the West and South leave less to charity. 
26 The first probate data study, Barthold and Plotnick (1984), examines a common law property state, 
Connecticut. Meanwhile, the two more recent probate record studies analyze community property states. 
Specifically, Bennett (1990) analyzes Texas, and Brunetti (2005) assesses California. 
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Likewise, Havens and Schervish (2006) report that Virginia ranks 14 among all states in 
its giving when looking at the entire population relative to its financial capacity (i.e., 
th 
income) to give while Louisiana ranks 25 . Consequently, it is expected that Louisiana 
decedents leave significantly less charitable bequests than their Virginia counterparts. 
Louisiana decedents are coded as " 1 " and Virginia residents take on the value of zero. 
Research Question 4 
The federal estate tax is scheduled to be phased out and eventually repealed in the 
year 2010 under EGTRRA. Although the repeal of the federal estate tax is currently 
scheduled to last only one year, there is strong support for a permanent repeal (Slemrod 
2006). Accordingly, it is important to garner evidence concerning the repeal of the estate 
tax on charitable bequests. The estimated decrease in charitable bequests if the federal 
estate tax is repealed is estimated by Joulfaian (2000b, 2005) to be 12% and 12.9%, 
respectively. Brunetti (2005) predicts that the tax law changes in 2010 compared to 2001 
will result in a 3.98% decrease in filers' charitable bequests. 
Following Joulfaian (2005, p. 15), coefficient and standard error estimates for the 
wealth and price parameters are used to predict the change in charitable bequests for each 
observation. The first step is to calculate the expected value for each decedent's 
charitable bequest as follows: 
CB = (W -T0)mj3plnP + /]Jn(W -T0) + jSJoc + W + ^p-
1 (10) 
Then, the predicted value from equation (11) is compared to the predicted value for each 
observation had the estate tax rates been equal to zero, or: 
CB = W[<Z>(J3W \nW + J3JOC + yl\ + 0a] (11) 
where P is the average tax price. Since there are contrasting forces that effect predicted 
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charitable bequests (i.e., wealth and tax price effect), this study has no a priori 
expectations as to the directional impact of repealing estate taxes. 
Summary 
Allowing deductible charitable bequests has provided the federal government 
with a powerful subsidizing mechanism for not-for-profit organizations. Also, charitable 
bequests represent a substantial portion of funding for many eleemosynary organizations. 
Nonetheless, there is strong support for the permanent repeal of estate taxes. As such, 
empirical evidence from timely and diverse charitable bequest decedents is crucial to 
project the impact of repealing estate taxes. This present study provides needed analysis 
by examining the five research questions stated in Chapter 1. This chapter presents the 
methodology by which these questions are tested. That is, the sampling procedure is 
explained, alternative statistical methodologies are contrasted, and variables of interest 
are discussed along with the means by which they are coded. Chapter 4 contains the 
results of the empirical investigation. 
CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Previous chapters contain: (1) a discussion of tax policy issues created by the 
deductibility of charitable bequests for estate tax purposes and the need for further 
research, (2) a review of prior charitable bequest research that has a direct influence on 
the current study, and (3) the development of the methodology used in this research 
effort. Using the methodology of the empirical tests discussed in the previous chapter, I 
present the empirical analysis results in this chapter. Summary statistics of the data are 
presented first followed by the Tobit model results under different tax price assumptions. 
Last, a discussion of the results pertaining to each of the research questions is provided. 
Summary Statistics of Input Data 
This research endeavor examines probate records from Louisiana and Virginia, 
450 records from each, respectively. Table 4.1 describes the key characteristics of the 
probate records 900 decedents. The sample means are computed with the SAS code that 
is detailed in Appendix A. Of these, approximately 32% (286 decedents) have a 
charitable bequest with the average amount being $397,088. The sample descriptive 
statistics also present preliminary evidence that the propensity to leave a charitable 
bequest is motivated by tax price. Specifically, observations with charitable bequests 
have a lower tax price than their non- bequeathing counterparts. 
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Table 4.1 Means of Key Variables 
Variable 
Made a Charitable Bequest 
Charitable Bequest (in $) 
Tax Price (date-of-death) 
Gross Estate (in $) 


















































Tax prices are first dollar tax prices. 
Both gross estate and wealth are larger for decedents with charitable bequests.27 
The gross estate imputation process described in Chapter 3 resulted in an average 
increase of $272,839 for the 102 probate records examined in this study that detailed the 
amounts paid for estate taxes.28 Consistent with prior research, the percentage of married 
decedents with charitable bequests (7.7%) is considerably lower than the percentage of 
those without the bequests (42.7%). The observations with charitable bequests have a 
smaller percentage of males (33.9%) than the observations without charitable bequests 
(48.5%o). Decedents with charitable bequests also have fewer surviving children. Trusts 
27 The overall average of the decedents' wealth in the current study ($771,740) is larger than the national 
average of $528,100 based on the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances (Bucks et al. 2006). The national 
average is equal to the mean family net worth with a head of household who is 75 or more years old as 
reported on in the Bucks et al. (2006 A8). This age group is selected because the head of household is that 
the mean age of this study's decedents is 79 years old. 
28 Estate tax payment amounts are not available in all probate records because they are sometime 
aggregated together with other payments under generic descriptions, e.g., administration expenses. 
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are utilized more (18.2% vs. 14.0%) by decedents without charitable bequests, implying 
that trusts are employed as a substitute rather than a complement to tax avoidance using 
charitable bequests. Decedents leaving charitable bequests also have a lower business 
share, most likely business owners have a lower proportion of liquid assets to use for 
charitable bequests.29 
Filers vs. Non-Filers 
An important distinction between the probate records examined in this study is 
whether the decedent files a federal estate tax return or not. Table 4.2 presents the 
descriptive statistics filers and non-filers. Filers (36.7%) are more likely to leave 
charitable bequests than non-filers (30.2%). 
Table 4.2 Means of Key Variables by Federal Estate Tax Return Filing Status 
Variable 
Made a Charitable Bequest 
Charitable Bequest (in $) 
Tax Price (date-of-death) 
Gross Estate (in $) 































Observations 218 682 
Notes: 
Tax prices are first dollar tax prices. 
The subsequent descriptive statistics analysis is limited to notably large discrepancies between sub-
samples. Furthermore, descriptive statistics regarding wealth are also not discussed because they are 
similar to the gross estate. 
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Moreover, the average charitable bequest given by filers ($428,857) is 
approximately 15 times larger than the bequest given by non-filers. Since Louisiana 
imposes inheritance taxes, non-filers have a tax incentive to leave charitable bequests. 
Nonetheless, it is clear from Table 4.2 that the tax incentive to leave charitable bequests 
for non-filers is still less than for filers. Despite the mean tax price for non-filers being 
0.996, the tax price for non-filers range from 0.92 to 1.00. 
The average gross estate of filers ($2,539,292) is almost 10 times larger than the 
average gross estate of non-filers ($278,743). It is worthwhile to note that the filers' 
average gross estate is comparable to the average gross estate ($2,557,888) reported on 
federal estate tax returns during the sample period of 2000-2005.30 
More non-filers are married (33.0%) than filers (27.1%). Filers utilize trusts at a 
higher rate than non-filers, 31.7% as compared to 12.2%. Because filers have larger 
amounts of wealth, they have both the means and the need to utilize trusts more 
frequently. Likewise, filers' have larger business shares (6.0%) than non-filers (1.1%). 
Virginia Sample 
Descriptive statistics of the Virginia observations are recorded in Table 4.3. One 
unique aspect of the Virginia decedents is that a larger portion of non-filers make 
charitable bequests (46.2%) than do filers (44.9%). Nevertheless, the average charitable 
bequest is substantially larger for filers ($547,322) than for non-filers ($55,081). 
The average gross estate reported on federal estate tax returns is calculated from the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) Statistics of Income (SOI) Estate Tax Data Tables, Filing Years 2000 through 2005 last 
accessed on May 14,2008 at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats /article/0„id=96442,00.html#2. 
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Table 4.3 Means of Key Variables for Virginia Observations by Federal Estate 
Tax Return Filing Status 
Variable 
Made a Charitable Bequest 
Charitable Bequest (in $) 
Tax Price (date-of-death) 
Gross Estate (in $) 

















































Tax prices are first dollar tax prices. 
Similar to the overall sample, the tax price is larger for filers than for non-filers. 
The mean tax price for non-filers is 1.00 because the Virginia inheritance tax was 
repealed in the 1970s and the state level estate taxes did not affect this study's non-filers 
in 2005. 
The average gross estate of filers in Virginia ($2,654,998) is much larger than that 
of non-filers ($364,857). The propensity to utilize trusts is greater among filers (36.0%) 
than non-filers (21.0%). Likewise, the average filers' business share (7.4%) is greater 
than that of non-filers (1.7%). 
Louisiana Sample 
Table 4.4 describes the Louisiana probate records. Here it is shown that non-
filers (16.6%) are less likely to give charitable bequests than are filers (23.2%). In a 
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similar fashion, charitable bequests from non-filers ($7,557) are considerably smaller 
than the bequests from their filer counterparts ($232,378). 
Table 4.4 Means of Key Variables for Louisiana Observations by Federal Estate 
Tax Return Filing Status 
Variable 
Made a Charitable Bequest 
Charitable Bequest (in $) 
Tax Price (date-of-death) 
Gross Estate (in $) 

















































Tax prices are first dollar tax prices. 
As noted in Chapter 3, the tax price variation for Louisiana decedents is increased 
when the inheritance tax exceeds the state death tax credit. In the current study, the 
inheritance tax exceeds the state death tax credit for 64.6% of the Louisiana decedents. 
As a result, the Louisiana inheritance tax increases the tax price variation for this study's 
filers and non-filers. Nonetheless, there are two main reasons why Louisiana non-filers' 
average tax price close to 1.00. First, as with the federal estate tax, the Louisiana 
inheritance tax allows for tax-free bequests to spouses. Second, the Louisiana inheritance 
tax was phased out during the sample period. 
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The gross estate of Louisiana filers ($2,347,387) is over ten times as large as that 
of non-filers ($205,266). Trust usage is more prevalent among filers (24.4%) than among 
non-filers (4.6%). Likewise, the average filers' business share (3.7%) is larger than that 
of non-filers (0.6%). 
A Comparison of Virginia and 
Louisiana Filers 
The current study is the first to analyze probate records from two states. As a 
result, it is important to assess diversity gained by expanding the study beyond a singular 
state. Since the majority of charitable bequests are given by filers, Table 4.5 presents a 
direct comparison of the Virginia and Louisiana filer samples. 
Table 4.5 Means Of Key Variables for Filers of Federal Estate Tax Returns in 
Virginia and Louisiana 
Variable 
Made a Charitable Bequest 
Charitable Bequest (in $) 
Tax Price (date-of-death) 
Gross Estate (in $) 































Observations 136 82 
Notes: 
Tax prices are first dollar tax prices. 
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The proportion of Virginia filers giving charitable bequests (44.9%) is almost 
twice that of Louisiana filers (23.2%). Moreover, the value of the Virginia filers' 
charitable bequests ($547,322) is also twice as large as the Louisiana filers' charitable 
bequests ($232,378). As expected in light of the large difference in both the propensity 
to give and the amount given, there is a substantial difference in the tax price and overall 
wealth between the decedents from the two states. The Virginia filers face a lower tax 
price and have slightly larger gross estates. 
The remaining demographic variables provide additional explanations as to why 
filers in Louisiana leave substantially less to charity. First, a larger portion of Louisiana 
filers are married (43.9%) than that of Virginia filers (16.9%). Second, Louisiana filers 
have more surviving children than Virginia filers. Third, Louisiana filers utilize trusts 
less often (3.7%) than Virginia filers (7.4%). Hence, examining decedents from two 
states enhances the generality of this study's results. 
Model Specification 
Tobit regression is the traditional econometric technique used to examine the 
impact of the estate tax on charitable bequests. Unfortunately, Tobit models utilize the 
maximum likelihood estimation, which produces inconsistent estimates when the error 
disturbance assumption of homogeneity and normality are violated (Arabmazar and 
Schmidt 1981, 1982). Previous estate tax research does not indicate the testing of these 
assumptions or potential remedies to the assumption violation. 
The current study uses the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test as described in Greene 
(2003) to test for homogeneity. Appendix B contains the SAS code for the Tobit 
regression along with tests for the homogeneity and normality assumptions. In the test, 
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the degrees of freedom for the LM test statistic are equal to the number of variables that 
may be related to the violation of constant error variances. Since no a priori expectations 
are available for identifying the heterogeneity variables, this study takes a conservative 
approach by assuming one degree of freedom. When there is a violation of homogeneity, 
the Heteroscedasticity Tobit model (H-Tobit) is estimated using the exponential 
specification of the error variance (Greene). Appendix C provides the SAS code for the 
H-Tobit regression. Based on the 90% chi-squared value with one degree of freedom, 
2.71, the homogeneity assumption is rejected in all models estimated in this study. For 
direct comparison purposes, both the Tobit and H-Tobit results are reported in the tables. 
When examining the normality assumption of error variances, this study uses the 
Chesher and Irishand (1987) version of the LM test as described in Greene (2003). Based 
on the 90% chi-squared value with two degrees of freedom, 4.61, the assumption of 
normality is rejected in all models estimated in this study with LM statistics ranging from 
30.63 to 132.31. Greene suggests that an alternative distribution may be utilized in the 
presence of non-normality. However, Greene (2003, 771) also states that assuming 
another distribution "does not necessarily solve the problem and may make it worse." 
The Box-Cox (BC) transformation is another technique used to address the non-normality 
issue. Amemiya and Powell (1981) note that a BC transformed variable cannot strictly 
be normal unless the transformation parameter of lamda is zero. As lamda approaches to 
zero, the BC transformation becomes the logarithm transformation of the dependent 
variable. Unfortunately, the current study has an abundance of zero values for the 
dependent variable, making the logarithm transformation mathematically impossible. A 
solution to address this problem is to add a small value to the dependent variable (e.g., 
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Atkinson and Halvorsen 1990). However, Burbridge et al. (1988) state that the BC 
model may not be suitable for zero-value observations that are replaced with other values. 
Consequently, the BC transformation is not utilized in this study. Rather, the 
econometric contributions of this study are addressing heteroscedasticity and bringing 
awareness to the presence of non-normality. 
Date-of-Death Tax Price Assumption 
Filers 
The first group of decedents analyzed under the date-of-death (DOD) tax price 
assumption is filers. This sample is of particular interest because they have a higher 
tendency to leave charitable bequests and the average charitable bequest is normally 10 
times larger than that of non-filers. Table 4.6 reports the traditional Tobit model for filers 
as model (1). With the LM statistic of 6.42, the assumption of homogeneity is rejected. 
The Tobit model is estimated with the adjustment for heteroscedasticity and the result is 
reported as model (2). 
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Table 4.6 Tobit and H-Tobit Regressions Assuming DOD Tax Prices 




























































































































































































Price Elasticity -0.9140 -1.4926 -17.2965 -11.6462 -0.8980 -0.9008 
Wealth Elasticity 1.6248 1.5691 1.1057 1.1339 1.1260 1.0785 
Observations 218 218 682 682 900 900 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is BSACB. 
Tax Price variable is for the DOD tax price. 
Parameter estimate of In Wealth is multiplied by 106. 
This study follows Joulfaian (2000b) to evaluate elasticities using the mean BSACB and the mean of z. 
P-values are in parentheses. 
_H. estimates include the parameters of and p-values of the independent variables that the H-Tobit model 
identified as significantly explaining the violation of homogeneity as described in Greene (2003, 769). 
Tax price is insignificantly negative; however, the tax price elasticity is -1.49. 
The BSACB is increasing in wealth with an elasticity of 1.57. The negative relation 
between the BSACB and the dummy variable for the location provides evidence that 
Louisiana decedents bequeath significantly less to charity after controlling for other 
characteristics of the decedents. This result presents further evidence that probate studies 
can examine multiple states to improve the generality of their results.31 
Non-Filers 
The next subsample of interest is non-filers. Although this sample provides fewer 
and smaller charitable bequests, they are still of importance for several reasons. First, 
with charitable bequests by non-filers amounting to approximately $21 million, an 
examination of this subsample may be of value to eleemosynary organizations. Second, 
several states may decouple their estate tax structure from the federal system if the 
equivalent exemptions remain at the current high levels. 
Table 4.6 reports the Tobit model for non-filers as model (3). However, the error 
distribution assumption of homogeneity is rejected (LM = 35.76). As a result, the 
The discussion of the Tobit and H-Tobit models is limited to the charitable bequest tax price, wealth, and 
location variables because these variables are tied to this study's research questions. The remaining 
explanatory variables are included to control for other characteristics of the decedent sample. 
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following discussion is based on the fourth model in Table 4.6. Tax price for non-filers is 
significantly negative with a corresponding elasticity of-11.65. This substantially large 
tax price elasticity indicates that eleemosynary organizations funding from non-filers is 
dramatically reduced when tax incentives for leaving charitable bequests are decreased. 
Consistent with the finding related to the filers, wealth is significantly positive with an 
elasticity of 1.13 for non-filers. As with the filers, there is a negative correlation between 
the BSACB and the location dummy variable. 
Entire Sample 
Overall trends in charitable bequests are evidenced in the entire sample models in 
Table 4.6. The assumption of homogeneity for the entire sample is rejected (LM = 
39.66). As a result, the following discussion is based on model (6) in Table 4.6. 
Consistent with the results for the subsamples, the BSACB is not significantly related to 
tax price. The corresponding tax price elasticity is -0.90. Wealth, by contrast, is 
significantly positive with an elasticity that exceeds the unity. Location is significantly 
negative, suggesting that Louisiana decedents bequeath a lower proportion of their 
overall budget to charitable organizations. 
Date-of-Will Tax Price Assumption 
Filers 
Besides the DOD tax system, the tax structure (i.e., marginal estate tax rates, 
exemption equivalent amounts, and treatment of spousal bequests) effective when a 
decedent last revised his/her will is another plausible source of tax prices. As such, the 
first model in Table 4.7 reports the Tobit model for decedents classified as filers at the 
date-of-will (DOW). The number of decedents classified as filers is larger under the 
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DOW (299) than the under the DOD (218) tax price assumption because the exemption 
equivalent amounts are smaller at the date of will. 
Table 4.7 Tobit and H-Tobit Regressions Assuming DOW Tax Prices 





































































































































































Price Elasticity -1.6984 — -15.3177 -8.4864 -1.1136 -1.0827 
Wealth Elasticity 1.2080 — 1.0972 1.1029 1.1032 1.0608 
Observations 299 299 601 601 900 900 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is BSACB. 
Tax Price variable is for the DOW tax price. 
Parameter estimate of In Wealth is multiplied by 106. 
This study follows Joulfaian (2000b) to evaluate elasticities using the mean BSACB and the mean of z. 
P-values are in parentheses. 
_H. estimates include the parameters of and p-values of the independent variables that the H-Tobit model 
identified as significantly explaining the violation of homogeneity as described in Greene (2003,769). 
The homogeneity assumption is rejected with a LM value of 7.57. Nonetheless, 
the H-Tobit model is not reported because the model cannot identify the independent 
variable(s) that significantly explain the violation of homogeneity.32 Neither the tax price 
nor the wealth is a significant determinant of BSACB. The corresponding tax price and 
wealth elasticities are -1.70 and 1.21. There is a significant negative relation between 
Location and BSCACB. 
Non-Filers 
Table 4.7 presents the Tobit model for non-filers as model specification (3). 
However, the error distribution assumption of homogeneity is rejected (LM = 34.72). As 
a result, the following discussion is based on the fourth model of Table 4.7. Similar to 
the results under the DOD assumption, tax price has a significant and large effect on 
BSACB. The coefficient of tax price is -6.9953, significant at the 1 percent level, and the 
tax price elasticity is -8.49. Though wealth has a significant positive effect on BSACB, 
the wealth effect is moderate relative to the tax price effect. BSACB is negatively related 
to the dummy variable location. 
The contradiction between the LM test and the H-Tobit estimation may be a result of using a 
conservative LM critical value with only one degree of freedom. Nevertheless, the conservative LM 
approach is employed due to the ramifications of failing to detect the violation of homogeneity. 
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Entire Sample 
The error distribution assumption of homogeneity for the entire sample is rejected 
(LM = 39.52). As a result, the following discussion is based on the sixth model of Table 
4.7. Wealth and location are significant determinants of BSACB with controlling for the 
decedents' other characteristics. In contrast, tax price does not have a significant effect 
on BSACB. Though tax price and wealth have different explanatory power, the 
magnitude of the effects of the two variables is similar, as shown by their corresponding 
elasticities of-1.08 and 1.06. 
Expected Date-of-Death Tax Price Assumption33 
Filers 
Besides the tax structure at the date of death or date of will, it is possible that 
bequests are determined based on the tax prices anticipated at a decedent's expected date 
of death. As a result of scheduled increases in the exemption equivalent, there are 164 
decedents classified as filers under the expected-date-of-death (EDOD) assumption.34 
Model (2) of Table 4.8 reports the H-Tobit results for the EDOD filers because the 
homogeneity assumption is rejected with a LM value of 3.43. 
33 There is no non-filer sample under the EDOD tax price assumption. Because all non-filers have the same 
charitable bequest tax price of 1.00, there is no variation in tax price. Hence, it is not possible to estimate 
the tax price variable for non-filers under the EDOD assumption. 
34 The exemption equivalent increases from 2006-2009. Furthermore, there are no federal estate taxes 
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Price Elasticity -1.0314 -0.8419 
Wealth Elasticity 1.4465 1.0082 
Observations 164 164 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is BSACB. 
Tax Price variable is for the EDOD tax price. 
Parameter estimate of In Wealth is multiplied by 106. 
This study follows Joulfaian (2000b) to evaluate elasticities using the mean BSACB 
and the mean of z. 
P-values are in parentheses. 
_H. estimates include the parameters of and p-values of the independent variables 
that the H-Tobit model identified as significantly explaining the violation of 
homogeneity as described in Greene (2003, 769). 
The H-Tobit adjustment has several important impacts on the EDOD results in 
Table 4.8. First, tax price coefficient estimate is positive from the H-Tobit model while it 
has a negative coefficient from the Tobit model. The H-Tobit results show that tax price 
is inelastic; however, the Tobit results indicate that the tax price is elastic. Second, 
wealth becomes insignificant with the adjustment for heteroscedasticity in error 
distribution. The wealth effect also becomes smaller. Third, the significant location 
effect disappears after adjusting for the heteroscedasticity. 
Tax Regime Restriction 
Researchers assume the tax price structure (i.e., marginal tax rates, exemption 
equivalent amounts, and treatment of spousal bequests) effective at the DOD, the DOW, 
or the EDOD when examining the impact of estate taxes on charitable bequests. 
However, it is not possible to know for sure which of these tax price structures is actually 
utilized by decedents. To reduce the ambiguity, decedents who updated their wills during 
the tax regime existing at the time of their death are identified (i.e., the tax regime 
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The first model in Table 4.9 presents the Tobit model for decedents classified as 
filers at their DOD. The homogeneity assumption is rejected with an LM value of 8.45. 
Nevertheless, the H-Tobit model is not reported because the model cannot identify the 
independent variable(s) that significantly explain the violation of homogeneity. Tax price 
has a significant negative effect. Additionally, with an elasticity of-1.45, the price effect 
has a large magnitude. In contrast, there is no significant wealth effect. Different from 
prior model results, the wealth elasticity of 0.94 is below the unity. This result may be 
created by the failure to address the violation of the homogeneity assumption. Similar to 
the EDOD H-Tobit results, the decedents' location has no impact BSACB. 
35 The sample of filers under the tax regime restriction should be interpreted with caution due to its small 
sample size. Long (1997) recommends that maximum likelihood estimations have at least 10 observations 
for every estimated parameter. However, this study has a sample of 47 filers under the tax regime 
restriction, making the Tobit model results questionable. 
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Table 4.9 Tobit and H-Tobit Regressions under the Tax Regime Restriction 









































































































































































Observations 47 47 129 129 176 176 
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Notes: 
The dependent variable is BSACB. 
Tax Price variable is for the DOD tax price. 
Parameter estimate of In Wealth is multiplied by 106. 
This study follows Joulfaian (2000b) to evaluate elasticities using the mean BSACB and the mean of z. 
P-values are in parentheses. 
_H. estimates include the parameters of and p-values of the independent variables that the H-Tobit model 
identified as significantly explaining the violation of homogeneity as described in Greene (2003, 769). 
Non-Filers 
The Tobit model estimation for non-filers under the tax regime restriction is 
reported in the third model of Table 4.9. Because homogeneity is rejected (LM = 5.04), 
an H-Tobit model is reported for the non-filers as the fourth model specification. 
Though the elasticity of -6.86 suggests a considerably large tax price effect, tax 
price has no significant explanatory power to explain the variation in BSACB across non-
filers. There is also no significant wealth effect. The wealth elasticity of 0.99 suggests 
that the change in wealth does not result in a dramatic change in BSACB. Moreover, 
there is no significant association of BSACB and location. 
Entire Sample 
The assumption of homogeneity for the entire sample is rejected (LM = 3.74). As 
a result, the following discussion is based on the sixth model of Table 4.9. Neither tax 
price nor wealth is significant determinants of BSACB. However, the change in tax price 
induces a larger change in BSACB than the change in wealth. In contrast, the coefficient 
of location is significantly negative. 
Research Question Analysis 
Research Question 1 
Rl: Is the deductibility of charitable bequests a budget efficient tax policy? 
That is, does a 1% change in the tax price lead to a larger than 1% 
change in charitable bequests? 
80 
One important contribution of research regarding how estate taxes influence 
charitable bequests is the assessment as to whether or not the deductibility of charitable 
bequests is a budget efficient policy. The elasticity of tax price is used to reach the 
conclusion. The tax price elasticities estimated from all models reported earlier in this 
chapter are summarized in Table 4.10 in order to facilitate an overall conclusion as to the 
budget efficiency of deductible charitable bequests. 
Table 4.10 Tax Price Elasticities by Filing Status, Heteroscedastic Specification, 
and Tax Price Date Assumptions 
Filers Non-Filers Entire Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Assumption Tobit H-Tobit Tobit H-Tobit Tobit H-Tobit 
I. DODTP -0.9140 -1.4926 -17.2965 -11.6462 -0.8980 -0.9008 
II. DOWTP -1.6984 — -15.3177 -8.4864 -1.1136 -1.0827 
III.EDODTP -1.0314 -0.8419 — — — — 
IV. Tax Regime 
Restriction -1.4472 — -7.8810 -6.8552 -1.3572 -1.3661 
Notes: 
This study follows Joulfaian (2000b) to evaluate elasticities using the mean BSACB and the mean of z. 
As shown in Table 4.10, tax price elasticities have absolute values larger than one. 
The results suggest that a greater percentage of wealth is being bequeathed to 
eleemosynary organizations than that being forgone in tax revenues. This supports the 
conclusion that the deductibility of charitable bequests is, indeed, a budget efficiency 
policy. Table 4.10 also reveals two additional noteworthy trends. First, tax price 
elasticities are substantially larger for filers than for non-filers. Second, correcting for 
heteroscedasticity has an impact on the tax price elasticities for subsamples of filers and 
non-filers. As such, future studies on the impact of tax price should take the error 
distribution into consideration. 
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Table 4.11 presents a comparison of this study's results and those of prior 
research. Overall, this study's results concerning tax price elasticities are consistent with 
prior study results. For example, similar to Brunetti (2005), this study finds an elastic tax 
price effect for filers under the DOD and DOW assumptions as well as the tax regime 
restriction. Additionally, Brunetti and the current study report that tax price elasticity for 
non-filers is considerably larger than that for filers. 
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Table 4.11 Comparisons of Tax Price Elasticities by Filing Status, and 
Tax Price Date Assumptions with Prior Studies 
Assumption 
I. DOD TP 
Current Study 
Brunetti (2005) 
Bennett (1990) (TP< 
(TP < .60) 
(.80 > TP > .60) 
(TP > .80) 




(TP < .60) 
(.80 > TP > .60) 




Boskin (1976): (1969 data) 
(TP < .60) 
(.80 > TP > .60) 




III. EDOD TP 
Current Study 
Brunetti (2005) 



































































Current study's elasticities are from the H-Tobit models except for filers under the assumptions of DOW 
and tax regime restriction samples. 
Brunetti's (2005) elasticities are from the model that includes both wealth and wealth squared terms. 
Bennett's (1990) elasticities are from the linear model with the dollar amount of charitable bequests as the 
dependent variable. There are also three separate adjusted disposable wealth effects, each corresponding 
to estates represented by the three tax price classifications. 
Barthold and Plotnick's (1984) elasticities are from the model with the logarithm of (the dollar amount of 
charitable bequests + 1) as the dependent variable. 
Joulfaian's (2005) elasticities are from the model with the dependent variable of CB(l-T')(W-To). 
Joulfaian's (2000b) elasticities are from the model with the dependent variable of [CB-(To-T)]/(W-To). 
Boskin's (1976) elasticities are from the first specification in Table 4 reported in the original paper. 
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Research Question 2 
R2: Is the wealth elasticity above unity? 
Another important component of research regarding how estate taxes influence 
charitable bequests is to gauge whether the elasticity of decedents' wealth exceeds unity. 
Table 4.12 summarizes all wealth elasticities estimated in the current study. Wealth 
elasticities are consistently above the unity under the DOD, DOW, and EDOD tax price 
assumptions. By contrast, the sample with the tax regime restriction that reduces the 
ambiguity regarding the tax price assumption has wealth elasticities below the unity. 
However, the wealth elasticities under the tax regime restriction are very close to unity 
because they are at least 0.94. The results in Table 4.12 generally support that the 
elasticity of wealth exceeds the unity. 
Table 4.12 Wealth Elasticities by Filing Status, Heteroscedastic Specification, 
and Tax Price Date Assumptions 
Assumption 
I. DOD TP 
II. DOWTP 
III. EDOD TP 











































This study follows Joulfaian (2000b) to evaluate elasticities using the mean BSACB and the mean of z. 
Table 4.13 presents the current study's wealth elasticities along with prior 
research results. For filers, the current research efforts show results consistent with prior 
research findings. However, there is a discrepancy in the magnitude of wealth elasticities 
between the current study and Brunetti (2005) under the tax regime restriction. This may 
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be partially attributable to the current study's smaller sample of filers. For non-filers, the 
wealth elasticity of the current study has a similar magnitude when compared to that of 
Brunetti under the tax regime restriction, a condition of less ambiguity. Further, for the 
entire sample, both the current study and Brunetti show the wealth elasticities above the 
unity under the DOD and the DOW tax price structures. 
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Table 4.13 Comparisons of Wealth Elasticities by Filing Status, and 






Wealth related to 
Wealth related to 
(TP-
(.80: 
Wealth related to (TP > 
<.60) 
> TP > .60) 
.80) 









III. EDOD TP 
Current Study 
Brunetti (2005) 


















































Current study's elasticities are from the H-Tobit models except for filers under the assumptions of 
DOW and tax regime restriction samples. 
Brunetti's (2005) elasticities are from the model that includes both wealth and wealth squared terms. 
Bennett's (1990) elasticities are from the linear model with the dollar amount of charitable bequests 
as the dependent variable. There are also three separate adjusted disposable wealth effects, each 
corresponding to estates represented by the three tax price classifications. 
Barthold and Plotnick's (1984) elasticities are from the model with the logarithm of (the dollar 
amount of charitable bequests + 1) as the dependent variable. 
Joulfaian's (2005) elasticities are from the model with the dependent variable of CB(l-T')(W-To). 
Joulfaian's (2000b) elasticities are from the model with the dependent variable of [CB-(To-T)]/(W-
To). 
Boskin's (1976) elasticities are from the first specification in Table 4 reported in the original paper. 
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Research Question 3 
R3: Does a decedent's location significantly affect charitable bequests? 
The extant literature on probate records restricts the analysis to individual states. 
Thus, the generality of previous probate studies is limited if there is a significant 
difference in charitable bequests of decedents located in different states. Considering 
this potential limitation, the current study analyzes probate records from two states, 
Virginia and Louisiana, and examines whether there is a significant difference between 
them. 
Table 4.14 provides a summary of the coefficients and corresponding p-values for 
the location dummy variable in the models presented earlier in this chapter. Overall, the 
results indicate that Louisiana decedents leave a significantly smaller portion of their 
wealth to eleemosynary organizations than Virginia decedents. There are certainly 
several confounding factors causing location to be significantly negative; however, this 
result does provide further support for prior research findings that decedents located in 
the South and community property states leave less to charity. As a result, future 
probate research can improve the generality of their results by collecting data from 
multiple states with geographical and property (community vs. common) law 
differences. 
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Table 4.14 Location Variable by Filing Status, Heteroscedastic Specification, 




III. EDOD TP 




























































Parameter estimate of In Wealth is multiplied by 106. 
P-values are in parentheses. 
Research Question 4 
R4: What is the predicted effect of repealing the estate tax on charitable bequests 
under EGTRRA? 
The federal estate tax is scheduled to be phased out in 2010 under EGTRRA 
before being reintroduced in 2011. However, there is substantial support for the 
permanent repeal of federal estate taxes (Slemrod 2006). Will repealing the federal estate 
tax have a significant impact on decedents' charitable bequests decisions? To answer this 
question, the predicted effects of repealing is assessed and reported in Table 4.15. 
88 
Table 4.15 Percentage Predicted Effects of Repealing the Federal Estate Tax by Filing 
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Percentage predicted effects of repealing the federal estate tax are estimated from the H-Tobit models 
except for filers in the DOW or tax regime restriction samples. 
The impact of adjusting the Tobit model for heteroscedasticity is highlighted by 
the dramatic differences in predicted changes in charitable bequests estimated from the 
Tobit and H-Tobit models. For instance, under the DOD assumption, repealing the 
federal estate tax will induce a decrease of 12.2% in the bequests from filers based on the 
H-Tobit estimation versus a decrease of 3.4% based on the Tobit estimation. The impact 
is even more pronounced under the EDOD tax price assumption as a decrease of 14.2% 
with the Tobit estimation changes to an increase of 25.2% with the H-Tobit estimation. 
The predicted changes in charitable bequests vary under different assumptions of 
the tax structure. Relying on the H-Tobit result for the sample of filers assuming the 
DOD tax price, this study finds that repealing the federal estate tax decreases charitable 
bequests. The H-Tobit estimation assuming the DOD tax price is deemed to be the most 
reliable for several reasons. First, the federal estate tax is only applicable to decedents 
classified as filers. Second, the DOW assumption is not as reliable as the DOD 
assumption because the wills date back to the 1960's. Third, the EDOD tax prices are 
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more speculative than the DOD tax prices. Fourth, the sample of filers under the tax 
regime restriction may be too small to allow for reliable maximum likelihood estimates. 
Table 4.16 compares this study's predicted effects of repealing the federal estate 
tax with previous research results. In magnitude, the predicted effect of repealing the 
federal estate tax does vary across studies. However, consistent with prior research, the 
current study's results suggest a decrease in the charitable bequests as a result of 
repealing the estate tax. 
Table 4.16 Comparisons of Predicted Effects of Repealing the Estate Taxes 

























All predicted changes are estimated under the DOD assumption tax prices. 
Current study's predicted changes are from the H-Tobit models. 
Brunetti's (2005) predicted changes are from the model that includes both wealth and wealth squared terms 
and compares the predicted bequests in 2001 versus 2010. 
Bennett's (1990) predicted change is from the linear model with the dollar amount of charitable bequests as 
the dependent variable. There are also three separate adjusted disposable wealth effects, each 
corresponding to estates represented by the three tax price classifications. 
Joulfaian's (2005) predicted change is from the model with the dependent variable of [CB-(To-T)]/(W-To). 
Joulfaian's (2000b) predicted change is from the FIML Tobit model with the dependent variable of [CB-
(To-T)]/(W-To). 
Summary 
The Heteroscedastic Tobit (H-Tobit) model is utilized to address the violation of 
the homogeneity in the error distribution. The empirical findings in this chapter provide 
evidence that the deductibility of charitable bequests is a budget efficient tax policy. 
The results in Table 4.15 are from the DOD tax price assumptions because that is generally the only 
assumption under which predicted changes are reported by prior studies. 
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Furthermore, the wealth elasticity is above the unity. The results suggest that charitable 
bequests are significantly related to a decedent's location. Last, repealing the federal 
estate tax decreases charitable bequests. The following chapter includes a summary and 
discussion of the results of this research effort. Implications and limitations of this study 
are disclosed and recommendations for future research are presented. 
CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, a summary of the previous chapters is outlined. Research findings 
of estate tax effects on charitable bequests are presented, followed by policy implications, 
limitations of the study, future research recommendations, and conclusions. 
Summary of Previous Chapters 
As discussed in Chapter 1, repealing the federal estate tax law has potentially 
harmful effects on charitable organizations that currently provide decedents with a tax-
free method of distributing their wealth. Repealing the federal estate tax may also impair 
the federal government's ability to prudently aid eleemosynary organizations if charitable 
bequests' preferential tax treatment is a budget efficient policy. Therefore, an empirical 
investigation is needed on the budget efficiency of charitable bequest exemptions and the 
overall change in charitable bequests if estate taxes are repealed. 
Chapter 2 includes a review of relevant prior studies that use the following data 
sources: federal estate tax returns or probate records. Studies of federal estate tax returns 
generally conclude that the estate tax with the charitable bequest exemption is a budget 
efficient policy. Probate research, by contrast, offers mixed results. Despite the 
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differences in their data, both types of studies predict that charitable bequests will 
decrease if the federal estate tax is repealed. 
Chapter 3 describes this study's research design and methodology. Virginia and 
Louisiana probate records from the years 2000-2005 are examined. The study of probate 
records from two states has the advantage of increasing the generality of results over 
prior single-state probate research. The informative value of probate records is enhanced 
by imputing decedents' taxable estate from estate tax payment records when available. 
Also, this study conducts specification tests and employs the H-Tobit model, thereby 
improving the consistency of parameter estimates. Several assumptions regarding the tax 
structure (i.e., DOD, DOW, EDOD, and tax regime restriction) considered by decedents 
are tested to increase the robustness of the findings. 
The research results are presented in Chapter 4. The results of this study suggest 
that an estate tax with a charitable bequest exemption is a budget efficient policy. 
Decedents' disposable wealth elasticity is above unity. Nonetheless, repealing the estate 
tax will decrease charitable bequests by approximately 12.2%. Conclusions regarding 
both the budget efficiency and the predicted repealing effect are substantially impacted 
by making necessary adjustments for heteroscedasticity. The following section 
summarizes the discussion of this study's four research questions. 
Summary of Research Findings 
The following four research questions are investigated in the current study: 
1. Is the deductibility of charitable bequests a budget efficient tax policy? That is, 
does a 1% change in tax price lead to a larger than 1% change in charitable 
bequests? 
2. Is the wealth elasticity above unity? 
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3. Does a decedent's location significantly affect charitable bequests? 
4. What is the predicted effect of repealing the estate tax on charitable bequests 
under EGTRRA? 
Tax price elasticities are generally negative with absolute values larger than one 
under several of the tax structure assumptions (i.e., DOD, DOW, and regime restriction). 
Although the findings of tax price elasticity hold for both filers and non-filers, non-filers 
are more sensitive to changes in the tax price than are filers. Therefore, the results 
suggest that the deductibility of charitable bequests is a budget efficient policy. 
The elasticity of wealth exceeds unity under all the tax structure assumptions 
except the regime restriction that is associated with a relatively smaller sample. 
Consequently, eleemosynary organizations are expected to have a percentage change in 
charitable bequests greater than the percentage change in wealth. This indicates that 
repealing the federal estate tax may increase charitable bequests because decedents' 
wealth is increased if they are not paying the federal estate tax. 
The generality of this study's results is enhanced by analyzing probate records 
from two states, Virginia and Louisiana. The amount of wealth left to charity is 
significantly different between the filers and non-filers of the two states. There are 
certainly several confounding factors inducing the significant location effect on charitable 
bequests; however, this result is consistent with prior research findings that decedents 
located in the South and community property states leave less to charity. Therefore, the 
current research effort suggests that future probate research can benefit from collecting 
data from multiple states. 
Repealing the federal estate tax has conflicting results on charitable bequests. On 
the one hand, repealing the estate tax eliminates decedents' tax price incentive to give 
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their wealth to eleemosynary organizations. On the other hand, repealing the estate tax 
provides more wealth to decedents who are shown to leave a larger portion of their 
wealth to charitable organizations as their wealth increases. The current research inquiry 
finds that the net effect of repealing the estate tax is to decrease charitable bequests by 
approximately 12.2%. 
Policy Implications 
The findings of this study have important implications for tax policy researchers 
and tax policy makers. Charitable bequests represent a significant source of funding for 
eleemosynary organizations. In fact, postmortem charitable receipts exceeded $17.44 
billion in 2005 (AAFRC 2006). Accordingly, tax policy makers have two important 
questions to address as they consider whether to permanently repeal estate taxes. First, is 
the deductibility of charitable bequests a budget efficient policy? Second, how will 
charitable organizations be affected in the absence of estate taxes? 
Prior literature generally concludes that the deductibility of charitable bequests is 
a budget efficient policy. However, there are several reasons why policy makers can 
benefit from further analysis. First, the most recent data analyzed by probate and federal 
estate tax return studies are 25 and 10 years old, respectively. The significant changes in 
the exemption equivalent and top federal estate tax rates since the time periods examined 
by prior studies necessitate an updated inquiry. Second, prior probate research may 
suffer from a lack of generality because they are single-state analysis. Third, previous 
studies do not report addressing the potential violation of the errors distribution 
assumption. When the homogeneity assumption is violated, parameter estimates tend to 
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be inconsistent. Fourth, the measurement of taxable estate in previous probate research is 
based either on probate assets or inheritance tax valuations. 
This study provides an analysis of the relationship between estate taxes and 
charitable bequests by examining more recent probate records from the years 2000-2005. 
Generality of the results is increased by assessing probate records from two states, 
Virginia and Louisiana. Since the assumption of homogeneous error distributions is 
consistently rejected, the H-Tobit model is utilized. The current research effort also 
imputes decedents' gross estates from reported estate tax liabilities rather than relying on 
probate assets as a proxy. 
These aspects of the current study make its results valuable for taxpayers and tax 
policy makers. Specifically, the deductibility of charitable bequests remains a budget 
efficient tax policy even in the presence of rising equivalent exemptions and decreasing 
maximum estate tax rates. This conclusion holds under all tax structure assumptions 
except for the EDOD. Another important finding of the current inquiry is that repealing 
the estate tax is expected to result in a 12.2% decrease in charitable bequests. 
Limitations of the Study 
While the information regarding estate tax liabilities recorded in the probate 
records helps to improve the accuracy of the findings in this study, it is not without its 
limitations. First, neither Louisiana nor Virginia probate records provide information 
regarding decedents' religious affiliations. By contrast, both Barthold and Plotnick 
(1984) and Brunetti (2005) find religious affiliation to be a significant explanatory 
variable. Without controlling for the religious factor, the current study may suffer from 
model misspecification. 
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Second, this study's probate records do not provide information regarding when 
widowed decedents lost their spouse. Accordingly, it is not possible to eliminate 
observations that became widowed prior to the introduction of the unlimited marital 
deduction as suggested by Joulfaian (2005). Nevertheless, this limitation is most likely 
mitigated by the fact that at least 18 years have passed when a decedent became widowed 
before the introduction of the unlimited marital deduction. Thus, the compounding effect 
of the events that occurred since they became widowed probably reduces the direct 
impact of limited spousal bequests. 
Third, although the generality of the results is increased by collecting probate 
records from two states, the sample still may not be representative of decedents from the 
entire country. Notwithstanding this limitation, two validity checks show that this 
study's decedents are comparable to national averages at least in size of the estate. 
Specifically, the average wealth of this study's decedents is similar to that of the national 
average in the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances (Bucks et al. 2004). Moreover, the 
average gross estates of the decedents examined in this study are comparable to the 2000-
2005 Statistics of Income (SOI) data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS 2008). 
Fourth, probate records do not contain potentially important behavioral 
information regarding decedents' history of volunteering or charitable giving during life. 
Fifth, the current study does not include last-dollar tax price assumptions due to the 
concern for a lack of an exclusion restriction. Last, although various methods are 
considered to address the existence of non-normality in the error distributions, no 
econometric techniques are employed due to the reasons detailed in Chapter 4. 
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Suggested Future Research 
This study discloses several issues that would benefit from further analysis. 
Specifically, will the results be sensitive to different econometric modeling techniques 
such as bootstrapping? In the absence of the federal estate tax, would taxpayers begin to 
leave more to eleemosynary organizations during their lifetime in order to take advantage 
of charitable contribution tax incentives on their annual income tax returns? 
Conclusions 
There is considerable support for permanently repealing the federal estate tax 
(Slemrod 2006). However, there are two important tax policy questions that need to be 
addressed before deciding to repeal the estate tax. First, does the preferential tax 
treatment of charitable bequests stimulate more giving than the corresponding loss in tax 
revenue? Second, what will the net impact be on charitable bequests if estate taxes are 
permanently repealed? Prior literature generally concludes that the deductibility of 
charitable bequests is a budget efficient tax policy and repealing the estate tax would 
decrease charitable bequests. 
The current study incorporates several methods to test the current relevance of 
prior research findings. Specifically, this study employs the H-Tobit model, when it is 
appropriate, to improve the reliability of the results; it examines the data collected under 
the recently increased equivalent exemptions; it examines probate records from two states 
to improve the generality of the results; and it utilizes a more accurate measure of taxable 
estate when available. With the increase in the current relevance and the reliability, this 
study's results suggest that the deductibility of charitable bequests is a budget efficient 
policy tax policy and the repeal of the estate tax will decrease charitable bequests by 
12.2%. 
APPENDIX A 
SAS CODE FOR SAMPLE MEANS 
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APPENDIX A 
SAS CODE FOR SAMPLE MEANS 
/* 1. Full sample */ 
data al; set dissertb.fullsample; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var sordr; output out = ol n=n total; run; 
data ola; set ol; var = 'ntotal ' ; mean = n_total; keep mean var; run; 
/* The preceding code is adjusted as follows for alternative model specifications. First, 
the filer and non-filer sample is created with the statement "if fir = 1" and "if fir = 0", 
respectively. Second, the Virginia and Louisiana sample is constructed with the 
statement "if loc = 0" and "if loc = 1", respectively.*/ 
data ala; set al; if cb > 0; run; 
proc means data = ala noprint; var cb; output out = o2 n=n cb; run; 
data o3; merge ol o2; drop _type freq_; pct_cb = n_cb / n_total; 
keep pet cb; run; 
data o3; set o3; var = 'pct_cb '; mean = pct_cb; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var cb; output out = o4 mean = mean; run; 
data o4; set o4; var = 'amt_cb '; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var tpddfd; output out = o5 mean = mean; run; 
data o5; set o5; var = 'tpddfd '; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var tpdwfd; output out = 06 mean = mean; run; 
data 06; set 06; var = 'tpdwfd '; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var tpedfd; output out = o7 mean = mean; run; 
data o7; set o7; var = 'tpedfd '; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var gsestate; output out = 08 mean = mean; run; 
data 08; set 08; var = 'gsestate'; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var w; output out = o9 mean = mean; run; 
data o9; set o9; var = 'wealth '; keep mean var; run; 
data alb; set al; if ms = 1; run; 
proc means data = alb noprint; var ms; output out = olO n=n ms; run; 
data o i l ; merge ol olO; drop _type freq_; pct_ms = n_ms /n_total; 
keep pet ms; run; 
data ol 1; set o i l ; var = 'pct_ms '; mean = pctms; keep mean var; run;data ale; set al; 
if gen = 1; run; 
proc means data = ale noprint; var gen; output out = ol2 n=n_male; run; 
data ol3; merge ol ol2; drop _type freq_; pct_male = n_male / n_total; 
keep pet male; run; 
data ol3; set ol3; var = 'pctjmale'; mean = pctjnale; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var sc; output out = ol4 mean = mean; run; 
data ol4; set ol4; var = 'children'; keep mean var; run; 
data aid; set al; if trst = 1; run; 
proc means data = aid noprint; var trst; output out = ol5 n=n trst; run; 
data 0I6; merge ol ol5; drop _type freq_; pctjrst = n_trst / njotal; 
keep pet trst; run; 
data 0I6; set 0I6; var = 'pctjrst'; mean = pctjrst; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var pbs; output out = ol7 mean = mean; run; 
data ol7; set ol7; var = 'pctbs '; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var aage; output out = 0I8 mean = mean; run; 
data ol 8; set ol 8; var = 'aage '; keep mean var; run; 
data fullsample; seto3 o4o5 o6o7o8o9o l l ol3 o l 4 o l 6 o l 7 o l 8 o l a ; 
mean_fullsample = mean; drop mean; run; 
/* 2. Sample with charitable bequest */ 
data al; set dissertb.fullsample; if cb > 0; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var sordr; output out = ol n=n total; run; 
data ola; set ol; var = 'njotal'; mean = njotal; keep mean var; run; 
data ala; set al; if cb > 0; run; 
proc means data = ala noprint; var cb; output out = o2 n=n cb; run; 
data o3; merge ol o2; drop Jype freq_; pct_cb = n_cb / njotal; 
keep pet cb; run; 
data o3; set o3; var = 'pet cb '; mean = pct_cb; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var cb; output out = o4 mean = mean; run; 
data o4; set o4; var = 'amtcb '; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var tpddfd; output out = o5 mean = mean; run; 
data o5; set o5; var = 'tpddfd '; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var tpdwfd; output out = 06 mean = mean; run; 
data 06; set 06; var = 'tpdwfd '; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var tpedfd; output out = o7 mean = mean; run; 
data o7; set o7; var = 'tpedfd '; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var gsestate; output out = 08 mean = mean; run; 
data 08; set 08; var = 'gsestate1; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var w; output out = o9 mean = mean; run; 
data o9; set o9; var = 'wealth '; keep mean var; run; 
data alb; set al; if ms = 1; run; 
proc means data = alb noprint; var ms; output out = olO n=n ms; run; 
data o i l ; merge o 1 o 10; drop _type freq_; pct_ms = n_ms / n_total; 
keep pet ms; run; 
data ol 1; set ol 1; var = 'pctjms '; mean = pctjms; keep mean var; run; 
data ale; set al; if gen = 1; run; 
proc means data = ale noprint; var gen; output out = ol2 n=n male; run; 
data ol3; merge ol ol2; drop _type freq_; pctjmale = n_male / n_total; 
keep pet male; run; 
data ol3; set ol3; var = 'pctjnale'; mean = pct_male; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var sc; output out = ol4 mean = mean; run; 
data ol4; set ol4; var = 'children'; keep mean var; run; 
data aid; set al; if trst = 1; run; 
proc means data = aid noprint; var trst; output out = ol5 n=n trst; run; 
data 0I6; merge ol ol5; drop _type freq_; pctjrst = njxst / n_total; 
keep pet trst; run; 
data 0I6; set 0I6; var = 'pcttrst'; mean = pctjrst; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var pbs; output out = ol7 mean = mean; run; 
data ol7; set ol7; var = 'pct_bs '; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var aage; output out = 0I8 mean = mean; run; 
data 0I8; set 0I8; var = 'aage '; keep mean var; run; 
data web; seto3 o4o5 06 o7 08 o9ol l ol3 ol4 o l6ol7 0I8 ola; 
mean_wcb = mean; drop mean; run; 
/* 3. Sample without charitable bequest */ 
data al; set dissertb.fullsample; if cb = 0; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var sordr; output out = ol n:=n total; run; 
data ola; set ol; var = 'ntotal ' ; mean = n_total; keep mean var; run; 
data ala; set al; if cb > 0; run; 
proc means data = ala noprint; var cb; output out = o2 n=n cb; run; 
data o3; merge ol o2; drop _type freq_; pct_cb = n_cb / ntotal; 
keep pct_cb; run; 
data o3; set o3; var = 'pet_cb '; mean = pctcb; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var cb; output out = o4 mean = mean; run; 
data o4; set o4; var = 'amtcb '; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var tpddfd; output out = o5 mean = mean; run; 
data o5; set o5; var = 'tpddfd '; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var tpdwfd; output out = 06 mean = mean; run; 
data 06; set 06; var = 'tpdwfd '; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var tpedfd; output out = o7 mean = mean; run; 
data o7; set o7; var = 'tpedfd '; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var gsestate; output out = 08 mean = mean; run; 
data 08; set 08; var = 'gsestate'; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var w; output out = o9 mean = mean; run; 
data o9; set o9; var = 'wealth '; keep mean var; run; 
data alb; set al; if ms = 1; run; 
proc means data = alb noprint; var ms; output out = olO n=n ms; run; 
data oi l ; merge o 1 o 10; drop _type freq_; pct_ms = n_ms / n_total; 
keep pet ms; run; 
data ol 1; set ol 1; var = 'pctms '; mean = pct_ms; keep mean var; run; 
data ale; set al; if gen = 1; run; 
proc means data = ale noprint; var gen; output out = ol2 n=n male; run; 
data ol3; merge ol ol2; drop _type freq_; pct_male = n_male / n_total; 
keep pet male; run; 
data ol3; set ol3; var = 'pct_male'; mean = pct_male; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data - al noprint; var sc; output out = ol4 mean = mean; run; 
data ol4; set ol4; var = 'children'; keep mean var; run; 
data aid; set al; if trst = 1; run; 
proc means data = aid noprint; var trst; output out = ol5 n=n trst; run; 
data 0I6; merge ol ol5; drop Jype freq_; pctjxst = n_trst / ntotal; 
keep pet trst; run; 
data 0I6; set 0I6; var = 'pet trst'; mean = pct_trst; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var pbs; output out = ol7 mean = mean; run; 
data ol7; set ol7; var = 'pctbs '; keep mean var; run; 
proc means data = al noprint; var aage; output out = 0I8 mean = mean; run; 
data ol8; set ol 8; var = 'aage '; keep mean var; run; 
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data wtcb; seto3 o4 o5 06 o7 08 o9oll ol3 ol4ol6ol7 0I8 ola; 
mean_wtcb = mean; drop mean; run; 
data table4_l; merge fullsample web wtcb; run; 
APPENDIX B 




SAS CODE FOR TOBIT REGRESSION 
data al; set dissertb.fullsample; wddl = wdd/1000000; wl = w/1000000; 
In tpddfd = log(tpddfd); lnjpddld = log(tpddld); ln_wddl = log(wddl); ln_wl = 
log(wl); run; 
/* The preceding code is modified as follows in regards to the different date of tax price 
assumptions. For the date of will and expected date of death tax price assumption, 
tpdwfd and tpedfd are used, respectively, rather than tpddfd. 
The following code is used to construct the tax regime sample, 
data a l a ; s e t d i s s e r t b . f u l l s a m p l e ; 
i f yd = 2000 or yd = 2001 then taxregime = 1; 
i f yd = 2002 or yd = 2003 then taxregime = 2; 
i f yd = 2004 or yd = 2005 then taxregime = 3; run; 
data a l b ; s e t a l a ; i f taxregime = 1; i f yw = 2000 or yw = 2001; run; 
data a l e ; s e t a l a ; i f taxregime = 2; i f yw = 2002 or yw = 2003; run; 
data a i d ; s e t a l a ; i f taxregime = 3 ; i f yw = 2004 or yw = 2005; run; 
data a l e ; s e t a l b a l e a i d ; run; 
data a l ; s e t a l e ; 
The remaining code is the same for the filers and non-filer subsamples with the following 
exceptions. First, the preceding line of code contains the statement "if fir = 1" and "if fir 
= 0" for the filer and non-filer samples, respectively. Second, the matrices defined in the 
Lagrange Multiplier tests are adjusted to reflect the different sample sizes. * / 
/* 1. Tobit Regression */ 
proc qlim data = al; 
model bsacbdd = lntpddfd lnjwddl loc pbs sc age gen trst ms; 
endogenous bsacbdd ~ censored (lb=0 ub=l); 
output out = a2 residual xbeta expected; 
title 'Standard Tobit (all)'; 
run; 
ods listing close; 
proc qlim data = al; 
ods output ParameterEstimates = Params; 
model bsacbdd = In tpddfd In wddl loc pbs sc age gen trst ms; 
endogenous bsacbdd ~ censored (lb=0 ub=l); 
run; 
ods listing; 
/**/ data Params tobit; set Params; model = 'tobit standard '; run; 
data Paramsl; set Params; if parameter = 'Sigma'; sigma = estimate; i = 888; 
keep sigma i; run; 
data a2; set a2; i = 888; run; 
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data a3; merge a2 Paramsl; by i; xbeta sigma = xbeta_bsacbdd / sigma; 
pdf xbetasigma = pdf('NORMAL',xbeta sigma); 
cdf_xbetasigma = cdf('NORMAL',xbeta_sigma); run; 
/* 2. Price & Wealth Elasticities */ 
/* params — parameters of In tpddfd & In weath*/ 
data Paramsp; set Params; if parameter = 'lntpddfd'; lntp_beta = estimate; i = 888; 
keep lntp beta i; run; 
data Paramsw; set Params; if parameter = 'ln_wddl'; lnwddl_beta = estimate; i = 888; 
keep lnwddl_beta i; run; 
/* calculate z and cdf(z) */ 
data el; set a3; z = xbeta sigma; run; 
proc means data = el noprint; var z; output out = e2 mean = mean z; run; 
data e2; set e2; drop _type freq_; cdfz = cdf('NORMAL',mean_z); i = 888; run; 
/* calculate mean of bsacbdd */ 
proc means data = a3 noprint; var bsacbdd; output out = e3 mean = mean_bsacbdd; run; 
data e3; set e3; drop _type freq ; i = 888; run; 
/* calculate price elasticity & wealth elasticity */ 
data e4; merge e2 e3 Paramsp Paramsw; by i; drop i; run; 
data e5; set e4; pe = cdfz * lntp beta * (1 / mean bsacbdd) - 1 ; 
we = cdfz * lnwddl beta * (1 / mean bsacbdd) + 1; run; 
data elasticity_tobit; set e5; model = 'tobitjstandard '; keep pe we model; run; 
/* 3. EGTRRA Prediction */ 
/* parameters of control variables */ 
data Paramsz; set Params; 
if parameter = 'LOC or parameter = TBS' 
or parameter = 'SC or parameter = 'AGE' 
or parameter = 'GEN' or parameter = 'TRST' 
or parameter = 'MS'; keep parameter estimate; run; 
proc transpose data = Paramsz out = Paramsz 2; run; 
data Paramsz_3; set Paramsz_2; locbeta = coll; pbsbeta = col2; 
sc beta = col3; age beta = col4; gen beta = col5; trst beta = col6; 
ms_beta = col7; i = 888; drop _name_ coll -- col7; run; 
data a4; merge a3 Paramsz 3 Paramsw; by i; run; 
data a5; set a4; e s tz = loc_beta*loc + pbs_beta*pbs + sc_beta*sc + age_beta*age 
+ gen_beta*gen + trst_beta*trst + ms_beta*ms; 
estlnwl = lnwddl beta * l n w l ; 
cbl =(wddl*(cdf xbetasigma*xbeta bsacbdd + pdf xbetasigma*sigma))/tpddfd; 
cb2 = wl*(cdf xbetasigma*(est lnwl + est z) + pdf xbetasigma*sigma); run; 
proc means data = a5 noprint; var cbl; output out = ocbl mean = cbl mean; run; 
proc means data = a5 noprint; var cb2; output out = ocb2 mean = cb2_mean; run; 
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data ocb tobit; merge ocbl ocb2; drop type freq ; 
diffcb2cbl = cb2 mean - cbl mean; pctcb2cbl = 100 * (diffcb2cbl / cbl_mean); 
model = 'tobit standard '; run; 
/* 4. Lagrange Multiplier (Heteroscedasticity & Nonnormality) */ 
/* define zi — zi = 1 if 0 < yi < 1; zi = 0 if yi <= 0 or yi >= 1 */ 
data a6; set a3; if 0 < bsacbdd < 1 then zi = 1; 
if bsacbdd le 0 then zi = 0; if bsacbdd ge 1 then zi = 0; run; 
/* calculate epsilon */ 
data a7; set a6; epsilon = bsacbdd - xbeta_bsacbdd; run; 
/* calculate Lambda */ 
data a8; set a7; phil = pdf_xbetasigma; phi2 = 1 - cdf_xbetasigma; 
Lambda = phil/phi2; run; 
/* calculate ai and bi */ 
data a9; set a8; sigmasq = sigma**2; sigmacub = sigma**3; epsilonsq = epsilon**2; 
a = zi * (epsilon/sigmasq) - (1-zi) * (Lambda/sigma); 
b = zi * ((epsilonsq/sigmasq - l)/(2* sigmasq)) + (1-zi) * 
((xbeta bsacbdd*Lambda)/(2*sigmacub)); 
drop sigmasq sigmacub epsilonsq; run; 
/* calculate the data vector gi = [ai*xi', bi]' */ 
data alO; set a9; a lntpddfd = a * In tpddfd; a lnwddl = a * In wddl; a loc = a * loc; 
a pbs = a * pbs; a sc = a * sc; a_age = a * age; a_gen = a * gen; a_trst = a * trst; 
a ms = a * ms; run; 
data al 1; set alO; bl = b; drop b; run; 
dataal2; set a l l ; b = bl ; drop bl; 
keep a_lntpddfd a_lnwddl a_loc a_pbs a_sc a_age a_gen a_trst a_ms b; run; 
/* LM test on Nonnormality: 
create the matrix M = [eiA3, eiA4 - 3*(eiA4)]' — where ei is equivalent to ai */ 
data al3; set a9; ml = a**3; m2 = a**4 - 3*(a**4); keep ml m2; run; 
data al4; merge al2 al3; run; 
proc iml; 
use al4; 
read all var { alntpddfd alnwddl a_loc a_pbs a_sc a_age a_gen a_trst a_ms b } into G; 
/* print "The matrix G (900x10) is", 
G; */ 
read all var { ml m2 } into M; 




GTGGITG = G * invCG' * G) * G'; 
D - M * inv(]Vr * M - M' * GTGGITG * M) * M'; 
reset print; 
LM hetero = one' * GTGGITG * one; 
pvalue = pdf('CHISQ',LMJietero,l); 
LM norm = one' * D * one; 
pvalue = pdfl['CHISQ,JLM_narm,2); 
title Tobit_all LM*; 
quit; 
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data al; set dissertb.fullsample; wddl = wdd/1000000; wl = w/1000000; 
In tpddfd = log(tpddfd); lnjpddld = log(tpddld); ln_wddl = log(wddl); ln_wl = 
log(wl); run; 
/* The preceding code is modified as follows in regards to the different date of tax price 
assumptions. For the date of will and expected date of death tax price assumption, 
tpdwfd and tpedfd are used, respectively, rather than tpddfd. 
The following code is used to construct the tax regime sample, 
data a l a ; s e t d i s s e r t b . f u l l s a m p l e ; 
i f yd = 2000 or yd = 2001 then taxregime = 1; 
i f yd = 2002 or yd = 2003 then taxregime = 2; 
i f yd = 2004 or yd = 2005 then taxregime = 3; run; 
data a l b ; s e t a l a ; i f taxregime = 1; i f yw = 2000 or yw = 2001; run; 
data a l e ; s e t a l a ; i f taxregime = 2 ; i f yw = 2002 or yw = 2003; run; 
data a i d ; s e t a l a ; i f taxregime = 3 ; i f yw = 2004 or yw = 2005; run,-
data a l e ; s e t a l b a l e a id; run; 
data a l ; s e t a l e ; 
The remaining code is the same for the filers and non-filer subsamples with the following 
exceptions. First, the preceding line of code contains the statement "if fir = 1 " and "if fir 
= 0" for the filer and non-filer samples, respectively. Second, the matrices defined in the 
Lagrange Multiplier tests are adjusted to reflect the different sample sizes. * / 
/* 1. Tobit Regression with Heteroskedasticity */ 
proc qlim data = al; 
model bsacbdd = In tpddfd lnwddl loc pbs sc age gen trst ms; 
endogenous bsacbdd ~ censored (lb^O ub=l); 
hetero bsacbdd ~ sc trst / link = exp noconst; 
output out = a2 residual xbeta expected; 
title 'Tobit with Heteroskedasticity (all)'; 
run; 
ods listing close; 
proc qlim data = al; 
ods output ParameterEstimates = Params; 
model bsacbdd = In tpddfd In wddl loc pbs sc age gen trst ms; 
endogenous bsacbdd ~ censored (lb=0 ub=l); 
hetero bsacbdd ~ sc trst / link = exp noconst; 
run; 
ods listing; 
data Paramsl; set Params; if parameter = 'Sigma'; sigma = estimate; i = 888; 
keep sigma i; run; 
/**/ data Params tobith; set Params; model = 'tobit hetero '; run; 
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data a2; set a2; i = 888; run; 
data a3; merge a2 Paramsl; by i; xbeta sigma = xbeta_bsacbdd / sigma; 
pdf xbetasigma = pdf('NORMAL',xbeta sigma); 
cdf_xbetasigma = cdf('NORMAL',xbeta_sigma); run; 
/* 2. Price & Wealth Elasticities */ 
/* params-- parameters of In tpddfd & In wealth*/ 
data Paramsp; set Params; if parameter = In tpddfd'; lntp_beta = estimate; i = 888; 
keep lntp beta i; run; 
data Paramsw; set Params; if parameter = 'lnwddl'; lnwddl_beta = estimate; i = 888; 
keep lnwddl_beta i; run; 
/* calculate z and cdf(z) */ 
data el; set a3; z = xbeta sigma; run; 
proc means data = el noprint; var z; output out = e2 mean = mean z; run; 
data e2; set e2; drop _type freq_; cdfz = cdf('NORMAL',mean_z); i = 888; run; 
/* calculate mean of bsacbdd */ 
proc means data = a3 noprint; var bsacbdd; output out = e3 mean = mean_bsacbdd; run; 
data e3; set e3; drop type freq ; i = 888; run; 
/* calculate price elasticity & wealth elasticity */ 
data e4; merge e2 e3 Paramsp Paramsw; by i; drop i; run; 
data e5; set e4; pe = cdfz * lntp beta * (1 / mean bsacbdd) - 1 ; 
we = cdfz * lnwddl beta * (1 / mean bsacbdd) + 1; run; 
data elasticity_tobith; set e5; model = 'tobit_hetero '; keep pe we model; run; 
/* 3. EGTRRA Prediction */ 
/* parameters of control variables */ 
data Paramsz; set Params; 
if parameter = 'LOC or parameter = 'PBS' 
or parameter = 'SC or parameter = 'AGE' 
or parameter = 'GEN' or parameter = 'TRST 
or parameter = 'MS'; keep parameter estimate; run; 
proc transpose data = Paramsz out = Paramsz 2; run; 
data Paramsz_3; set Paramsz_2; locbeta = coll; pbsbeta = col2; 
sc beta = col3; age beta = col4; gen beta = col5; trst beta = col6; 
ms_beta = col7; i = 888; drop _name_ coll -- col7; run; 
data a4; merge a3 Paramsz 3 Paramsw; by i; run; 
data a5; set a4; estjz = loc_beta*loc + pbs_beta*pbs + sc_beta*sc + age_beta*age 
+ gen_beta*gen + trst_beta*trst + ms_beta*ms; 
estlnwl = lnwddl beta * l n w l ; 
cbl = (wddl*(cdf xbetasigma*xbeta bsacbdd + pdf xbetasigma*sigma))/tpddfd; 
cb2 = wl*(cdf xbetasigma*(est lnwl + est z) + pdf xbetasigma*sigma); run; 
proc means data = a5 noprint; var cbl; output out = ocbl mean = cbl_mean; run; 
proc means data = a5 noprint; var cb2; output out = ocb2 mean = cb2_mean; run; 
data ocb tobith; merge ocbl ocb2; drop type freq ; 
diffcb2cbl = cb2 mean - cbl mean; pctcb2cbl = 100 * (diffcb2cbl / cblmean); 
model = 'tobithetero '; run; 
REFERENCES 
AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy. 2006. Charitable Giving Rises by 6 Percent to More 
than $260 Billion in 2005. Indianapolis, IN. 
Amemiya, T. 1973. Regression analysis when the dependent variable is truncated 
normal. Econometrica 41 (6): 997-1016. 
., and J. L. Powell. 1981. A comparison of the Box-Cox maximum likelihood 
estimator and the non-linear two-stage least square estimator. Journal of 
Econometrics 17: 351-381. 
. 1984. Tobit models: A survey. Journal of Econometrics 24: 3-61. 
Arabmazar, A., and P. Schmidt. 1981. Further evidence on the robustness of the tobit 
estimator to heteroskedasticity. Journal of Econometrics 17: 253-258. 
. 1982. An investigation of the robustness of the tobit estimator to non-normality. 
Econometrica 50 (4): 1055-1063. 
Arias, E. 2002. United States life Tables, 2000. National Vital Statistics Reports 51 (3). 
. 2004a. United States life Tables, 2001. National Vital Statistics Reports 52 (14). 
. 2004b. United States life Tables, 2002. National Vital Statistics Reports 53 (6). 
. 2007a. United States life Tables, 2003. National Vital Statistics Reports 54 (14). 
. 2007b. United States life Tables, 2004. National Vital Statistics Reports 56 (9). 
Atkinson, S. E., and R. Halvorsen. 1990. The valuation of risks to life: Evidence from 
the market for automobiles. The Review of Economics and Statistics: 133-136. 
Bakija, J., and W. Gale. 2003. Effects of estate tax reform on charitable giving. Tax 
Policy Issues and Options, No. 6. Washington, D.C.: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy 
Center, July. 
and Slemrod, Joel. 2003. Charitable bequests and taxes on inheritance and estates: 




Barthold, T., and R. Plotnick. 1984. Estate taxation and other determinants of charitable 
bequests. National Tax Journal 37 (2): 225-237. 
Bennett, S. K. 1990. The economics of bequest patterns. Ph.D. Diss., Rice University. 
Boskin, M. J. 1976. Estate taxation and charitable bequests. Journal of Public 
Economics 5 (January-February): 27-56. 
., and M. Feldstein. 1977. Effects of the charitable deduction on contributions by 
low income and middle income households: evidence from the National Survey of 
Philanthropy. Review of Economics and Statistics 59: 351-354. 
Bradley, R., S. Holden., and R. McClelland. 2005. A robust estimation of the effects of 
taxation on charitable contributions. Contemporary Economic Policy 23 (4): 545-
554. 
Bratti, M., A. McKnight, R. Naylor., and J. Smith. 2004. Higher education outcomes, 
graduate employment and university performance indicators. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series A (Statistics in Society) 161 (3): 475-496. 
Brunetti, M. J. 2005. The estate tax and charitable bequests: elasticity estimates using 
probate records. National Tax Journal 58 (2): 165-188. 
Bucks, B. K., A. B. Kennickell, and K. B. Moore. 2006. Recent changes in U.S. family 
finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 survey of consumer finances. Federal 
Reserve Bulletin: A1-A38. 
Burbidge, J. B., L. Magee, and A. L. Robb. 1988. Alternative transformations to handle 
extreme values of the dependent variable. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 83: 123-127. 
Chesher, A., and M. Irishand. 1987. Residual analysis in the grouped and censored 
normal linear model. Journal of Econometrics 34 (1-2): 33-62. 
Clotfelter, C. T. 1985. Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving. University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago. 
CCH. 2007. Unified rate table, estate and gift taxes for U.S. residents, citizens, and 
nonresident aliens (after November 9, 1988). Accessed 2 February 2007. Available 
http://tax.cchgroup.com/primesrc/bin/highwire.dll. 
Dopuch, N., R. W. Holthausen, and R. W. Leftwich. 1987. Predicting audit 
qualifications with financial and market variables. The Accounting Review 62 (3): 
431-454. 
116 
Greene, W. H. 2003. Econometric Analysis, 5 edition. Upper Saddle River, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Gujarati, D. N. 2003. Basic Econometrics, 4rth edition. New York, NY: McGraw-
Hill/Irwin. 
Havens, J. J., and P. G. Schervish. 2006. Center on wealth and philanthropy charitable 
giving indicies: Social indicators of philanthropy by state. The Boston Foundation: 1-
13. 
Joesch, J. M., and B. G. Hiedemann. 2002. The demand for nonrelative child care among 
families with infants and toddlers: A double-hurdle approach. Journal of Population 
Economics 15: 495-526. 
Jones, A., and J. Posnett. 1991. Charitable donations by UK households: Evidence from 
the Family Expenditure Survey. Applied Economics 23: 343-351. 
. 1992. A note on computation of the double-hurdle model with dependence with 
an application to tobacco expenditure. Bulletin of Economic Research 44 (1): 67-74. 
Joulfaian, D. 1991. Charitable bequests and estate taxes. National Tax Journal 44 (2): 
169-180. 
. 2000a. A quarter century of estate tax reforms. National Tax Journal 53 (3): 
343-360. 
. 2000b. Estate taxes and Charitable Bequests by the Wealthy. National Tax 
Journal 53 (3 part 2): 743-764. 
. 2005. Estate taxes and charitable bequests: Evidence from two tax regimes. 
U.S. Department of Treasury, OTA Paper 92 March: 1-30. 
Kennedy, P. 2005. Guide to Econometrics. Blackwell Publishers, 5th Edition. 
Kopczuk, W., and J. Slemrod. 2003. Tax impacts on wealth accumulation and transfers 
of the rich. Death and Dollars: The role of gifts and bequests in America. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Long, J. S. 1996. Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Maddala, G. S. 1991. A perspective on the use of limited-dependent qualitative 
variables models in accounting research. The Accounting Review 56 (4): 788-807. 
McNees, S. K. 1973. Deductibility of charitable bequests. National Tax Journal 26 (1): 
79-98. 
117 
Newman, C , M. Henchion, and A. Matthews. 2001. Infrequency of purchase and 
double-hurdle models of Irish households' meat expenditure. European Review of 
Agricultural Economics 28 (4): 393-419. 
Poterba, J. M. 1998. Inter vivos transfers and the incentive effects of estate and gift 
taxes in the United States. MIT. Mimeo. 
Randolph, W. C. 1995. Dynamic income, progressive taxes, and the timing of charitable 
contributions. Journal of Political Economy 103 (4): 709-738. 
Revels, R. W. Jr. 2007. Comparative oil & gas law: Louisiana insert update. May 14. 
Available at: http://www.landman.org/content/annmtg07/Comparative%20oil%20 
and%20gas%201aw%20LA%202007%20update.pdf. 
Slemrod, J. 2006. The role of misconceptions in support for regressive tax reform. 
National Tax Journal 59 (1): 57-75. 
Smith, Scott M. 1980. Giving to charitable organizations: A behavioral review and a 
framework for increasing commitment. Advances in Consumer Research 7: 753-756. 
Smith, E. P., J. H. Philip, and J. R. Hasselback. (2006). 2007 CCH Federal Taxation. 
Chicago: CCH. 
Tobin, J. 1958. Estimation of relationships for limited dependent variables 
Econometrica 26: 24-36. 
U.S. Census Bureau, County and City Data Book: 2000. 
Yen, S. T., and H. H. Jensen. 1996. Determinants of household expenditures on alcohol. 
The Journal of Consumer Affairs 30 (1): 48-67. 
